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WHEN  THE  BROOKINGS Panel on Economic  Activity began in 1970, the 
world economy  roughly accorded  with the idea of three distinct  eco- 
nomic systems:  a capitalist first world, a socialist  second  world, and a 
developing  third world which aimed for a middle way between  the first 
two. The third world was characterized not only by its low levels  of per 
capita GDP, but also by a distinctive economic  system that assigned the 
state sector the predominant role in industrialization,  although not the 
monopoly  on industrial ownership as in the socialist economies. 
The  years  between  1970 and  1995, and especially  the last  decade, 
have  witnessed  the  most  remarkable institutional  harmonization  and 
economic  integration among nations in world history.  While economic 
integration was increasing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the extent of 
integration has come sharply into focus only since the collapse  of com- 
munism in 1989. In 1995 one dominant global economic  system is emerg- 
ing. The common  set of institutions  is exemplified  by the new  World 
Trade  Organization  (WTO),  which  was  established  by  agreement  of 
more than 120 economies,  with almost all the rest eager to join as rapidly 
as possible.  Part of the new trade agreement involves  a codification of 
basic principles governing trade in goods and services.  Similarly, the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) now boasts nearly universal member- 
ship,  with  member countries  pledged  to  basic  principles  of  currency 
convertibility. 
Most programs of economic  reform now underway in the developing 
world and in the post-communist  world have as their strategic aim the 
1 2  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
integration of the national economy  with the world economy.  Integra- 
tion means not only increased  market-based trade and financial flows, 
but also  institutional  harmonization  with regard to trade policy,  legal 
codes,  tax systems,  ownership patterns, and other regulatory arrange- 
ments. In each of these areas, international norms play a large and often 
decisive  role in defining the terms of the reform policy.  Most recently, 
China made commitments on international property rights and trade pol- 
icy with a view toward membership in the WTO, and membership in the 
world system  more generally.  Russian economic  reforms are similarly 
guided by the overall aim of reestablishing the country's place within the 
world market system.  In several  sections  of its April 1995 agreement 
with the IMF, the Russian government commits to abide by WTO princi- 
ples, even in advance of membership. 
The goal of this paper is to document the process of global integration 
and to assess  its effects on economic  growth in the reforming countries. 
Using  cross-country  indicators  of trade openness  as the measures  of 
each country's orientation to the world economy,  we examine the timing 
of trade liberalization,  and the implications  of trade liberalization  for 
subsequent  growth and for the onset  or avoidance  of economic  crises. 
Of course,  trade liberalization is usually just one part of a government's 
overall reform plan for integrating an economy  with the world system. 
Other aspects of such a program almost always include price liberaliza- 
tion, budget restructuring, privatization, deregulation, and the installa- 
tion of a social safety net. Nonetheless,  the international opening of the 
economy is the sine qua non of the overall reform process.  Trade liberal- 
ization not only establishes  powerful direct linkages between  the econ- 
omy and the world system,  but also effectively  forces the government to 
take actions  on the other parts of the reform program under the pres- 
sures of international competition.  For these  reasons,  it is convenient 
and fairly accurate  to  gauge  a country's  overall  reform program ac- 
cording to the progress of its trade liberalization. 
Our analysis helps to answer several debates concerning cross-coun- 
try growth patterns. Most important, we help to resolve  the widely dis- 
cussed  conundrum  concerning  economic  convergence  in  the  world 
economy.  Long-held judgments about the development  process,  as well 
as  the  workhorse  formal  models  of  economic  growth,  suggest  that 
poorer countries should tend to grow more rapidly than richer countries 
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main reason  for  expecting  economic  convergence  is  that the  poorer 
countries can import capital and modern technologies  from the wealth- 
ier countries,  and thereby reap the "advantages of backwardness."  Yet 
in recent  decades,  there has been  no overall  tendency  for the poorer 
countries to catch up, or converge,  with the richer countries. 
We show that this problem is readily explained by the trade regime: 
open economies  tend to converge,  but closed  economies  do not.  The 
lack  of  convergence  in recent  decades  results  from the fact  that the 
poorer countries have been closed  to the world. This is now changing 
with the spread of trade liberalization programs, so that presumably the 
tendencies  toward  convergence  will  be  markedly  strengthened.  The 
power of trade to promote economic  convergence  is perhaps the most 
venerable tenet of classical  and neoclassical  economics,  dating back to 
Adam Smith. As Smith's followers  have stressed for generations,  trade 
promotes growth through a myriad channels:  increased  specialization, 
efficient resource allocation according to comparative advantage, diffu- 
sion of international knowledge through trade, and heightened domestic 
competition as a result of international competition. I 
This paper has three main parts. In the first section  we discuss  the 
patterns and chronology  of trade policy reforms in the postwar period. 
Viewed from the perspective  of world economic  history since  1850, the 
closed nature of the world trading system at the end of World War II was 
a historical  anomaly.  The open  trade of the late nineteenth  and early 
twentieth centuries had collapsed following two world wars and a global 
depression.  Postwar liberalization  has painstakingly restored  an open 
trading system somewhat reminiscent of the world in 1900, with two cru- 
cial differences.  First, developing  countries in Africa and Asia are now 
sovereign,  rather than colonies  of  the  Western  powers.  Second,  the 
world economy  is increasingly  supported by international commercial 
law agreed to by individual governments and implemented with the sup- 
port of international institutions such as the WTO and the IMF. 
1.  Lucas (1988) and Young (1991) observe that standard trade theory predicts an effect 
of openness  on the level,  not the long-run growth rate, of GDP. Of course,  a level effect 
can appear as a growth effect for long periods of time, since adjustments in real economies 
may take place over decades.  Some recent theory has introduced various forms of increas- 
ing returns to scale with the result that openness  can affect long-term growth as well as the 
level of income.  See Young (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Eicher (1993), and Lee 
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The second  section examines  the impact of postwar trade liberaliza- 
tion on economic  performance in the developing  countries.  We demon- 
strate the basic proposition that open trade leads to convergent rates of 
growth, that is, to higher growth rates in poorer countries than in richer 
countries.  The importance  of trade policy  is demonstrated  in several 
cross-country  growth equations in which we hold constant other deter- 
minants  of  growth.  We  also  show  that open  economies  successfully 
avoid balance-of-payments  crises,  while many closed  economies  even- 
tually succumb to such crises. 
The third section reviews the evidence  on the success  of trade liberal- 
ization  programs after  1980. First,  we  show  that in many developing 
countries trade liberalization has followed a severe macroeconomic  cri- 
sis (such as a debt crisis or very high inflation). A very few developing 
countries have remained relatively open since World War II or since the 
time of their independence-Barbados,  Cyprus,  Malaysia,  Mauritius, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)- 
but most of the others opened much later, mainly in the 1980s or 1990s, 
and usually in response to a deep macroeconomic  crisis.2 In many cases, 
economic  reform paid off  after  a few  years  in  terms  of  accelerated 
growth of GDP. This is true in all major regions of the world, including 
sub-Saharan Africa.  In a small number of countries,  however,  a new 
economic  crisis ensued after the start of full-fledged reforms. These set- 
backs,  in Chile in the early  1980s, Venezuela  in the early  1990s, and 
Mexico in late 1994, seem to be related to financial market liberalization 
and exchange rate mismanagement.3 
We also present evidence on the growth effects of reforms in the post- 
communist  countries  of eastern Europe and the former Soviet  Union. 
Here too we find evidence  that economic  reforms lead to a renewal of 
economic growth. Strong reformers seem to outperform weak reformers 
both in terms of a smaller decline of GDP between  1990 and 1994, and 
in terms of an earlier resumption of economic  growth. The evidence  is 
necessarily  fragmentary,  however,  given  the very  short period for in 
which the reforms have been in operation. 
2.  Some developing countries,  such as Peru, Sri Lanka, and several Central American 
countries, were rather open at the end of World War II, but then moved into a prolonged 
phase of import substitution in the 1950s and 1960s. 
3.  See Sachs,  Tornell, and Velasco  (1995) and Warner (1994) regarding the Mexican 
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Liberalization  and Global  Integration  before  1970 
One and one-half centuries ago, two close  observers  of the capitalist 
revolution in Western Europe made a pithy prediction about the course 
of global economic  change.  Marx and Engels  correctly  sensed  the un- 
precedented  efficiency  of the industrial capitalism  that had emerged. 
They predicted that as a result of superior economic  efficiency,  capital- 
ism would eventually  sweep through the entire world, compelling other 
societies  to restructure along the lines of Western Europe.  In the pun- 
gent rhetoric of the Communist Manifesto  they expostulated  that: 
The bourgeoisie,  by the rapid  improvement  of all instruments  of production,  by 
the immensely  facilitated  means of communication,  draws all, even the most 
barbarian,  nations  into civilization.  The cheap  prices of its commodities  are the 
heavy artillery  with  which  it batters  down  all Chinese  walls, with  which  it forces 
the barbarians'  intensely  obstinate  hatred  of foreigners  to capitulate.  It compels 
all nations,  on pain of extinction,  to adopt  the bourgeois  mode of production;  it 
compels them to introduce  what it calls civilization  into their  midst, i.e., to be- 
come bourgeois  themselves.  In one word,  it creates  a world  after  its own image.4 
Marx and Engels  got much disastrously  wrong in their predictions, 
but they correctly sensed the decisive  global implications of capitalism. 
As  they  foresaw,  capitalism  eventually  spread  to  nearly  the  entire 
world,  in a complex  and sometimes  violent  process  that dramatically 
raised worldwide living standards but also provoked social upheaval and 
war. It is often forgotten today,  in the flush of the communist collapse 
after 1989, that global capitalism has emerged twice,  at the end of the 
nineteenth century as well as the end of the twentieth century. The ear- 
lier global capitalist system peaked around 1910 but subsequently  disin- 
tegrated in the first half of the twentieth century, between  the outbreak 
of World War I and the end of World War II. The reemergence  of a 
global,  capitalist market economy  since  1950, and especially  since the 
mid-1980s, in an important sense  reestablishes  the global market econ- 
omy that had existed one hundred years earlier. 
The first episode of global capitalism, of course,  came about as much 
through the instruments of violent conquest and colonial rule as through 
economic  reform  and  the  development  of  international  institutions. 
Starting around 1840, Western European powers wielded their superior 
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industrial-and  hence military-power  to challenge traditional societies 
around the world. France began to colonize  North Africa in the  1830s 
and  1840s;  Britain  forced  its  way  into  China  in  the  Opium  Wars, 
1839-42;  Britain  and  France  defeated  Russia  in  the  Crimean  War, 
1854-56; and Britain completed  the conquest  of India in 1857. Among 
the populous  societies  of Asia and Near East,  only Japan was able to 
mobilize social and political institutions to support market reforms, im- 
plementing history's  first "shock therapy" reforms following  the  1868 
Meiji Restoration.s 
By the 1870s a global market had begun to take shape on the following 
economic  lines.  Western Europe and the United States constituted  the 
main industrial powers.  A major push toward industrialization,  espe- 
cially in east-central Europe, followed  the unification of Germany. Rus- 
sia began a period of rapid industrialization, partly through the building 
of foreign-financed railways across  Russian Eurasia. Japan had begun 
its dramatic opening to the world economy  through the adoption of capi- 
talist institutions and free trade. (Note that early Japanese industrializa- 
tion took place entirely under free trade, since  the dominant Western 
powers  imposed  low  Japanese tariff levels  through "unequal treaties" 
that lasted until the end of the century.) Latin America, after a half cen- 
tury of postindependence  upheaval,  finally settled  into market-based, 
export-led growth in the 1870s, based on raw materials exports and capi- 
tal imports (primarily for railroad construction).  Africa,  which lagged 
farthest behind, was gobbled up by the Western European powers in an 
orgy of imperial competition  that reached its height between  1880 and 
1910. Trade barriers remained low among these  economies  for several 
decades,  from the 1860s to 1914.6 
5.  See Jansen and Rozman (1988) for a detailed analysis of the economic,  political, and 
social reforms of the Meiji period. 
6.  The era of nineteenth-century  free trade is usually dated from 1846, when Britain 
unilaterally liberalized by repealing the Corn Laws.  (In fact, liberalization had begun ear- 
lier, with the abolition of export duties in 1842 and the reduction of import duties in 1842 
and 1845.) The next decisive  step was the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, which liberal- 
ized British-French trade. The new German Reich was established  by Bismarck on free 
trade principles and low tariffs in the early 1870s. It is often suggested that this free trade 
era ended in 1879 with a renewed wave of protectionism,  starting with Bismarck's accep- 
tance of the famous tariff of bread and iron, which raised imports duties on agriculture 
and steel.  Higher tariffs soon followed  in France and Italy. In fact, even with these tariff 
increases,  average tariff rates remained low until World War I, and nontariff barriers (for 
example,  quotas and exchange  controls)  were  virtually nonexistent.  According  to data 
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As in the late twentieth century, the emergence of the first global sys- 
tem was based on the interaction of technology  and economic  institu- 
tions.  Long-distance  transport and  communications  achieved  break- 
throughs similar to those in the present.7 The Suez Canal, completed in 
1869, and the Panama Canal, completed in 1914, dramatically cut inter- 
national shipping times,  as did the progressive  development  of faster 
and larger steamships from the 1840s. New railways in India, Russia, the 
United  States,  and Latin America-often  built with foreign finance- 
opened  vast,  fertile  territories for  settlement  and economic  develop- 
ment.  The spread of telegraph lines and transoceanic  cables  from the 
1850s linked the world at electronic  speed.  Military innovations,  partic- 
ularly the breech-loading rifle in the 1840s, combined with mass-produc- 
tion made possible  by industrialization,  decisively  shifted the military 
advantage to Europe. Medical advances,  particularly the use of quinine 
as a preventative  against malaria, played a pivotal role in the spread of 
European  settlements,  domination,  and investment,  especially  in Af- 
rica. Without doubt, these technological  breakthroughs were as revolu- 
tionary in underpinning the emerging global system as those of our own 
age. 
On the economic  level,  key institutions  similarly spread on a global 
scale.  International gold and silver standards became  nearly universal 
after the  1870s, eventually  embracing North  and South America,  Eu- 
rope, Russia, Japan, China, as well as other European colonies and inde- 
pendent countries. By 1908 roughly 89 percent of the world's population 
lived in countries  with convertible  currencies  under the gold or silver 
standard.8 Basic  legal  institutions,  such  as  business  and commercial 
imports stayed below  10 percent in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; between 
10 and 20 percent in Italy; between 20 and 30 percent in the United States; and between 20 
and 40 percent in Russia. 
7.  See Headrick (1981). 
8.  See Eichengreen and Flandreau (1994, p. 9). The countries on the gold or silver stan- 
dards in 1908 include, in Europe: United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Switzerland,  Italy, 
Germany,  Netherlands,  Portugal,  and Romania; in North  America:  United  States  and 
Canada; in Central America: Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador,  and 
Costa Rica; in South America: Peru, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela,  and Argentina; in Asia and 
the Pacific: India, China, Indonesia,  Japan, Siam, Philippines,  and Australia; and in the 
Middle East: the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Persia. The national currencies were con- 
vertible into gold in all cases except the following: Italy, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Nicara- 
gua, Guatemala, Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela.  The Italian and Austrian currencies 
were stable though not convertible. 8  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
codes,  were widely  adopted.  These  were based on European models, 
mainly the Napoleonic  Code.  New  multilateral institutions were estab- 
lished,  such as the Universal Postal Union in 1878. 
The system  was highly integrative,  as in the present.  A network of 
bilateral trade treaties kept protectionism in check in most countries (the 
United States and Russia, where tariff rates were relatively high, being 
the exceptions).  Nations as diverse as Argentina and Russia struggled to 
adjust their economic  policies,  and especially  their financial policies,  to 
attract foreign investment,  particularly for railway building. The adop- 
tion of a stable currency tied to gold was seen as a key step in the strategy 
of international integration. In Russia, Count Witte recalled how he out- 
maneuvered  the conservative  tsarist court  to introduce the gold stan- 
dard at the end of the nineteenth century.9 In Latin America, liberal mar- 
ket regimes stabilized under both democratic (Argentina and Chile) and 
authoritarian (Brazil and Mexico)  political  regimes.  In all four cases, 
overall growth of GDP and exports was very rapid, indeed historically 
unprecedented.  India similarly enjoyed  rapid export  growth between 
1870 and 1914, under British rule. 
In a series of important papers, Jeffrey Williamson and his collabora- 
tors have  shown  that the open  international system  at the end of the 
nineteenth century produced an era of economic  convergence.  10  Periph- 
eral countries  in Europe,  such as Ireland and the Scandinavian  coun- 
tries, experienced  rapid growth that narrowed the gap in real wages with 
the more advanced  countries,  the United  Kingdom,  France,  and Ger- 
many.  Former European colonies  in Latin America and the South Pa- 
cific (Australia and New Zealand) similarly achieved convergent growth 
rates based on export-led growth. 
In a massive study of long-term growth in forty-one developing coun- 
tries,  Lloyd  Reynolds  similarly finds that the open international econ- 
omy of 1850-1914 was crucial in promoting the onset of rapid economic 
growth in much of the developing  world outside  of Europe and North 
America.1I Reynolds  notes  that "politics apart, the main factor deter- 
mining the timing of turning points has been a country's ability to partici- 
pate effectively  in the trade opportunities  opened  by expansion  of the 
world economy.""2 He then points out the wide range of countries that 
9.  See Owen (1  994, pp. 15-16). 
10.  See Williamson (1992, 1993) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1994). 
1  1.  Reynolds (1985). 
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were indeed able to avail themselves  of the burgeoning trade opportuni- 
ties, including almost all of Latin America (with the exception  of Vene- 
zuela); much of Asia,  including but not limited to Ceylon,  Burma, Ma- 
laya, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines; and parts of Africa, 
including Algeria,  Nigeria,  Ghana, the Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  Uganda, 
Tanganyika, and Southern Rhodesia.  13 
Surely the most  famous  evocation  of this remarkable international 
setting is given by Keynes in the opening pages of The Economic  Conse- 
quences of the Peace: 
What  an extraordinary  episode in the economic progress  of man that age was 
which  came  to an end in August  1914!  . . . The  inhabitant  of London  could  order 
by telephone, sipping  his morning  tea in bed, the various  products  of the whole 
earth,  in such quantity  as he might  see fit, and reasonably  expect their  early  de- 
livery upon his doorstep;  he could at the same moment  and by the same means 
adventure  his wealth  in the natural  resources  and  new enterprises  of any quarter 
of the world, and share, without  exertion or even trouble, in their  prospective 
fruits  and advantages;  or he could decide to couple the security  of his fortunes 
with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial  municipality  in any 
continent  that fancy or information  might  recommend.  He could secure forth- 
with, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable  means  of transit  to any country  or 
climate  without  passport  or other formality,  could despatch  his servant  to the 
neighbouring  office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might 
seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad  to foreign  quarters,  without 
knowledge  of their  religion,  language,  or customs, bearing  coined wealth  upon 
his person,  and  would  consider  himself  greatly  aggrieved  and  much  surprised  at 
the least interference.  But, most important  of all, he regarded  this state  of affairs 
as normal,  certain, and permanent,  except in the direction  of further  improve- 
ment, and  any deviation  from  it as aberrant,  scandalous,  and  avoidable.  14 
Keynes  rightly intuited in  1919 that the Humpty  Dumpty  of world 
markets and shared institutions would not soon be put back together in 
the harsh peace that followed World War I. Indeed, the war and its after- 
math laid waste to the emergent global capitalist system for more than 
half a century.  The financial underpinnings of the late-nineteenth-cen- 
tury liberal order were not reestablished.  British dominance in the inter- 
national financial system was ended by the Great War, and neither U.S. 
leadership nor international cooperation  took its place."5 Financial in- 
stability and the failure of the gold standard rocked the 1920s and con- 
tributed to the Great Depression  of the 1930s. The export-led growth of 
13. Reynolds (1985, pp. 34-35). 
14.  Keynes (1919, pp. 6-7). 
15.  See Kindleberger (1973) and Eichengreen (1993). 10  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
the primary producers in Latin America and elsewhere  was undermined 
by low and unstable commodities  prices in the 1920s, and then was dev- 
astated by the Great Depression,  which brought the utter collapse of the 
terms of trade, intense protectionism  in Europe and the United States, 
and the end of capital inflows. 
Political  upheaval  accompanied  economic  and  military  upheaval. 
Most important was the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, and the 
emergence of fascist states in Italy and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s 
respectively.  In Latin America,  the traditional political  power  of the 
landholders  and mine owners  was  undermined by the collapse  in the 
terms of trade. The free  trade regimes  of the late nineteenth  century 
were replaced by a revolutionary regime in Mexico and authoritarian re- 
gimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, that were heavily  influenced by 
the state planning of the communist  and fascist  regimes  in the Soviet 
Union and Europe. 16 Throughout the world, state planning, authoritari- 
anism, and militarism competed  with limited government  and market- 
based economies.  Whether or not economic  theory offered insights and 
predictions about these alternative strategies, political leaders felt com- 
pelled to push for new and radical experimentation. 
The changing zeitgeist  is again decisively  captured by Keynes,  in his 
remarkable lecture  "National Self-Sufficiency"  delivered  in Ireland in 
1933, when the world was in the depths of the Great Depression.  17 In the 
lecture,  Keynes  rejects the commitment  to free trade and the interna- 
tional  harmonization  of  institutions,  declaring  the  late-nineteenth- 
century  experience  a massive,  and apparently  inevitable,  failure.  In 
Keynes's  view,  the international system led to war, by stoking the com- 
petition among the leading powers: 
The protection  of a country's  existing  foreign  interests,  the capture  of new mar- 
kets, the progress  of economic  imperialism-these are  a scarcely  avoidable  part 
of a scheme  of things  which  aims  at the maximum  of international  specialisation 
and at the maximum  geographical  diffusion  of capital  wherever  its seat of own- 
ership. 18 
For this reason,  countries  are best linked by ideas and culture,  not 
economic  and financial entanglements.  Keynes  writes: 
I sympathise,  therefore,  with  those who would  minimise,  rather  than  with those 
who would maximise,  economic entanglements  between  nations.  Ideas, knowl- 
16.  See Thorp (1984) for very insightful essays  on the country-by-country  experience. 
17.  Keynes (1933). 
18.  Keynes  (1933, p. 236). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  11 
edge, art, hospitality,  travel-these  are the things  which should  of their nature 
be international.  But let goods be homespun  whenever  it is reasonably  and  con- 
veniently  possible;  and, above all, let finance  be primarily  national.  19 
But perhaps more to the point,  Keynes  stressed,  was  the fact that 
countries simply demanded the right to experiment with new economic 
models, since the old ones no longer commanded respect and assent. He 
joined  the chorus for experimentation,  vividly  exemplifying  the end of 
intellectual faith in global capitalism by the 1930s: 
The point is that there is no prospect  for the next generation  of a uniformity  of 
economic  systems  throughout  the world,  such  as existed, broadly  speaking,  dur- 
ing the nineteenth  century;  that  we all need to be as free as possible of interfer- 
ence from  economic  changes  elsewhere, in order  to make  our  own favourite  ex- 
periments  towards  the ideal social republic  of the future;  and that a deliberate 
movement  towards  greater  national  self-sufficiency  and  economic isolation  will 
make  our  task easier, in so far  as it can be accomplished  without  excessive eco- 
nomic  cost.20 
Ironically, while Keynes  would fundamentally reverse course  himself, 
coming to see aggregate demand management and international institu- 
tions such as the IMF as the linchpins of a renewed global capitalist sys- 
tem, the genie of experimentation  unleashed by the collapse  of faith in 
market institutions lived on to dominate most of the world through much 
of the postwar era. 
The  Tripartite  World  after  1945 
At the end of World War II, the international economic  system  was 
in a shambles.  International markets for trade in goods,  services,  and 
financial assets were essentially nonexistent.  International trade was de- 
stroyed  by currency  inconvertibility  and a web  of protectionist  mea- 
sures stemming from the Great Depression  and World War II. When the 
IMF published its first comprehensive  review of exchange rate arrange- 
ments in 1950, only five countries had established freely convertible cur- 
rencies  under  the  standard  of  article  VIII  of  the  IMF  Articles  of 
Agreement:  the  United  States  and  four  Latin  American  countries 
pegged to the dollar, El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Mexico,  and Panama.2' 
Switzerland, not then a member of the IMF, also had a convertible cur- 
rency.  The IMF characterized  another four countries  as having effec- 
19.  Keynes (1933, p. 236). 
20.  Keynes (1933, p. 241). 
21.  IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,  1950. 12  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Lively  convertible currencies,  even though they had not yet formally ac- 
cepted  the  obligations  of  article  VIII:  Cuba,  Dominican  Republic, 
Honduras, and Venezuela.  As late as 1957, only two more countries had 
established convertibility  subject to article VIII: Canada and Haiti. The 
members  of  the  European  Community  established  convertibility  in 
1958. Most other developing and socialist countries postponed the move 
for decades. 
While market-based economic  linkages were methodically  restored 
among the leading countries during the 1950s, most of the world's popu- 
lation lived in countries that chose fundamentally nonmarket economic 
strategies for development.  Roughly one-third of the world's population 
lived in socialist  countries  (as measured by Kornai for the year  1986); 
another  50 percent  or so  lived  in countries  where  governments  pro- 
claimed a kind of "third way" between  capitalism and socialism,  state- 
led industrialization (SLI).2 
In figure 1, we show the time profile of the opening of the world econ- 
omy in the postwar era, using the specific criteria for openness discussed 
below  and in the appendix. The world economy  was essentially  closed 
after World War II, and only around 20 percent of the world's population 
lived in open economies  by  1960. It was not until 1993 that more than 
60 percent of the world's GDP, and more than 50 percent of the world's 
population,  was located in open economies.23 The figure extends  up to 
1994, so that by our criteria, neither Russia nor China is part of the open 
system.  If both of these countries cross the threshold to openness  (and 
trade reforms in 1995 might well lead them to qualify), the proportion of 
openness by population would jump another 30 percent, to reach around 
87 percent of the world's population; and the proportion of openness  by 
GDP would jump by another 15 percent,  to reach around 83 percent of 
the world's GDP (using 1975 weights in both cases). 
The  governments  of  almost  all the  developing  countries  adopted 
either socialist  or SLI policies  after World War II. This was true of the 
22.  The population in socialist  countries  is measured  by Kornai (1992, pp. 6-7)  for 
1986. The population under SLI is based on the authors' calculations using data from Sum- 
mers and Heston (1991). 
23.  Let PO,  be the proportion of the world economies  that are open in year t, as shown 
in figure 1. PO, is constructed  as PO,  =  IVt'75Djt  -1,  where Dit -1 is a dummy variable set 
equal to one if the country is open as of year t -  1, and zero otherwise.  W(75  is the weight 
of country i in the world in 1975. The weights are constructed  using 1975 population data 
and 1975 real GDP data from version 5.6 of the data in Summers and Heston (1991). Jeffrey  D.  Sachs  and Andrew  Warner  13 
Figure 1.  Share of Open Economies in the World,  1960-95a 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations.  The  weights  are constructed  using  1975 population  data and  1975 real GDP  data 
from version  5.6 of the data in Summers and Heston  (1991). 
a.  Let  PO,  be  the  proportion  of  the  world's  economies  that are open  in  year  t.  PO,  is  constructed  as  POt  = 
7"'i75Di,  ,, where Di,-,  is a dummy variable set equal to one if the country is open as of year t-  1, and zero otherwise. 
lt'M75 is the weight of country i in the world in 1975. 
long-independent  economies  of Latin America  as well  as most  of the 
postcolonial  countries  of  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and Asia  as  they 
gained independence.  Of course,  in the cases of Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic  states,  these  policies  were  imposed  by the force  of the Soviet 
Union,  rather than being the result  of indigenous  political  decisions. 
More  generally,  trade policies  reflected  a wide  variety  of  economic 
forces,  intellectual  beliefs,  internal political  economy,  foreign  policy 
considerations,  and other economic  forces.  While no summary can do 
justice to the complex and myriad forces at play, it is important to review 
them,  if only  to  appreciate  that socialist  and SLI  policies  should  be 
understood  mainly  as  "policy  experiments"  (albeit  enormously  mis- 
taken and costly  ones),  rather than as inevitable  consequences  of the 
economic  structures of the countries in question. 
INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  FORCES.  Probably the most important 
factor behind the advent of SLI policies  after World War II was the col- 
lapse of the world trading system itself. Since almost none of the richer 14  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
countries had convertible currencies or low external tariff rates, the gov- 
ernment of any individual developing country naturally viewed its trad- 
ing prospects  with considerable  skepticism.  This "export pessimism" 
was shared by a wide range of postwar economic  analysts.  Moreover, 
since the value of trade liberalization generally depends on the openness 
of potential trading partners, the choice  of closed  trading policies  can 
be understood, in part, as a kind of low-level  trading equilibrium.24  This 
explanation helps to account for the delay in liberalization in most devel- 
oping countries after World War II. It is not as helpful, however,  in ex- 
plaining the behavior of about one dozen  countries  (mainly in Central 
and South America, as noted later) that were relatively open in the late 
1940s, but closed  up during the  1950s and early  1960s.25  Nor does  the 
closed nature of the world economy  in the late 1940s explain the persis- 
tence  of closed  policies  in developing  countries  even  after the United 
States, Canada, the European Community, and Japan had adopted more 
outward policies  in the 1960s. A full explanation must therefore look to 
other factors. 
MACROECONOMIC  POLICIES.  The roots of postwar currency incon- 
vertibility at the end of World War II lay as much in macroeconomics  as 
in trade policy.  Although exchange  controls  were introduced in many 
countries  during the Great Depression,  the pressures  of wartime infla- 
tionary finance were probably an even greater factor in the spread of in- 
convertibility.  In country after country, government wartime purchases 
were  financed  through inflationary finance  (that is,  government  bor- 
rowing from the central bank), coupled  with domestic  price controls, 
foreign exchange controls,  and extensive  rationing of goods.  By the end 
of the war, there was an enormous overhang of nominal money balances 
in most countries.  In the British Commonwealth,  for example,  the In- 
dian government held large reserves of sterling which were restricted in 
use according to imperial monetary policy. 
24.  Rodriguez (1974), using a two-country  model in which  each  country uses  trade 
quotas to shift the terms of trade in its favor, shows  that zero trade is typically the Nash 
equilibrium, since each country optimally responds to a tightening of trade quotas by simi- 
larly tightening its own quotas. 
25.  The "late protectionists"  are shown in table 11: Bolivia,  Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Morocco,  Nicaragua, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Syria, Turkey, and Venezuela.  Most of the Central American countries closed during the 
formation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) in the early 1960s; the An- 
dean countries (Bolivia,  Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela)  closed partly as the result ofjoint 
actions of the Andean Group, and partly as the result of internal political choices. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  15 
Under these circumstances,  the restoration of exchange rate convert- 
ibility required either a monetary reform (to remove the monetary over- 
hang); a temporary rise of prices and a currency devaluation (to absorb 
the monetary overhang through inflation); a long period of real economic 
growth to raise the demand for nominal money balances; or some combi- 
nation of the three. Milton Friedman cogently  argued that a floating ex- 
change  rate  (combined  with  price  decontrol)  was  the  best  policy:  it 
would  establish  convertibility,  and hence  the monetary  basis for free 
trade, automatically and immediately.26 Most countries, however,  shied 
away from the temporary inflationary consequences  that would have ac- 
companied  such a move,  even  though they would have been one-shot 
rather than ongoing. Largely for this reason, the return to convertibility 
in Europe and many other parts of the world was delayed for more than 
a decade after World War II. 
In some countries, the consequences  were even more long-lasting. In 
India, for example, various attempts to relax price controls and to rees- 
tablish free trade led to a spurt in prices and a subsequent reversal of the 
policy.27 For several years, half-hearted attempts at liberalization were 
reversed as the result of the accompanying price increases.  During this 
period the ideology of state control gained in importance, as Jawaharlal 
Nehru consolidated  his hold on the Indian leadership.  Thus the initial 
macroeconomic  pressures  delayed  the establishment  of convertibility, 
while ideology  and interest-group lobbying cemented  the postwar poli- 
cies of inconvertibility,  licensing,  and protection. 
Even  after the  1950s, macroeconomic  instability  continued  to pro- 
duce  closed  trade  practices  in  many  countries.  Throughout  Latin 
America,  populist  fiscal  policies  repeatedly  undermined the  commit- 
ment to currency convertibility and allowed the emergence of significant 
black market premiums on the exchange rate in countries with a pegged 
rate regime. In this way trade practices were often closed inadvertently, 
as a result of overly expansionary macroeconomic  policies,  rather than 
26.  Friedman (1953) has typically  been read as an argument for floating rather than 
fixed exchange rates. More fundamentally, it is an argument for convertibility (which auto- 
matically follows from floating rates) as compared to inconvertibility (which often accom- 
panies a fixed exchange  rate regime).  Friedman reasoned  that a commitment  to a fixed 
exchange rate would almost inevitably lead to balance-of- payments pressures and hence, 
multiple exchange rates or other forms of inconvertibility.  This was certainly the pattern 
as of 1953. 
27.  See Tomlinson (1992). 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
deliberately.  Nonetheless,  the economic  effects  were similar: a rise in 
the relative prices of import-competing goods,  a reduction of imports, 
and a reduction of exports. 
INTELLECTUAL  B ELI  EFS.  Several currents of intellectual belief coa- 
lesced  to support the nearly worldwide  adoption of SLI and socialist 
strategies. Following two world wars and the Great Depression,  the lib- 
eral world view seemed to be indefensible.  Capitalism had proved to be 
rapacious and violent, as J. A. Hobson and Lenin had predicted.28 Even 
Keynes  had subscribed to this view in 1933. Moreover,  the Marxist no- 
tion that profits were the result of the exploitation  of labor was  an ex- 
traordinarily enticing explanation for elites in the poorer countries, who 
could justifiably view  the poverty  of their own nations as the result of 
degradations committed by the richer nations. 
Moreover,  as Keynes  had seemingly  demonstrated,  capitalism was 
inherently unstable and needed  the steadying rudder of the state,  per- 
haps in the form of the nearly full nationalization of future investment. 
It should be remembered that banking, insurance,  and much heavy  in- 
dustry were  nationalized  in France  (under Charles De  Gaulle) and in 
Britain (under Clement Atlee)  as well as in many other Western Euro- 
pean countries,  and not just in the developing and socialist worlds. 
At the same time, there was a growing belief that coordinated,  large- 
scale public investment was necessary  to make a breakthrough to mod- 
ernizing  industrialization.  Paul  Rosenstein-Rodan  championed  the 
strategy of the "big push," and Alexander  Gershchenkron  argued that 
the idea was supported by the history of nineteenth-century  Europe, in 
which the countries lagging in industrialization increasingly relied on the 
state to catch up with the richer countries.29  The greater the gap at the 
start of industrialization, according to Gershchenkron,  the greater was 
the state's role in mobilizing resources for the breakthrough. The appar- 
ent industrial successes  of the Soviet  Union,  which had proved  suffi- 
cient to defeat Nazi Germany, seemed to many observers to give ample 
confirmation of the technical  possibilities  of investment  planning and 
state-led  industrialization.  These  ideas,  backed  up by  the  new  tech- 
niques of national income accounting, input-output analysis, and mathe- 
matical growth models,  led to the widespread endorsement of develop- 
ment planning models in mainstream development  economics. 
28.  See Hobson (1902) and Lenin (1926). 
29.  See Rosenstein-Rodan  (1943) and Gershchenkron and Nimitz (1952). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  17 
Export pessimism combined with the idea of the big push to produce 
the highly influential view  that open trade would condemn  developing 
countries to long-term subservience  in the international system  as raw 
materials exporters  and manufactured goods  importers.  Comparative 
advantage,  it  was  argued  by  the  Economic  Commission  of  Latin 
America  (ECLA)  and others,  was  driven by short-run considerations 
that would prevent raw materials exporting nations from ever building 
up an industrial base.  The protection of infant industries was therefore 
vital if the developing  countries  were to escape  from their overdepen- 
dence  on  raw  materials  production.  These  views  spread  within  the 
United Nations  system  (to regional offices  of the United Nations  Eco- 
nomic Commission),  and were adopted largely by the United  Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development  (UNCTAD).  In 1964 they found 
international legal sanction in a new part IV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which established  that developing  coun- 
tries should enjoy the right to asymmetric trade policies.  While the de- 
veloped  countries should open their markets, the developing  countries 
could continue to protect their own markets. Of course, this "right"  was 
the proverbial rope on which to hang one's own economy! 
More  radical  anti-capitalist  views  fueled  Marxist-inspired  revolu- 
tions in nearly two dozen countries during the postwar period. Forrest 
Colburn offers a masterful evocation  of the underlying ideas and sym- 
bols common to these revolutions.30 He puts great stress on the role of 
ideas, rather than the political economy  in motivating the revolutionary 
leaders: 
The trajectory  of contemporary  revolutionary  regimes  illuminates  why, at least 
in poor countries, the choices of political  elites are so consequential.  In many 
such countries,  political  elites are not significantly  constrained  by either  the in- 
stitutions  and  norms  of government  or by civil society. Thus,  the time  for  experi- 
mentation  and  implementation  of ideas can be dangerously  compressed.31 
STATE  BUILDING.  In his classic analysis of European mercantilism, 
Eli Heckscher argued that mercantilist trade and industrial policies were 
a crucial mechanism by which new nation states consolidated their polit- 
30.  The list, as provided by Colburn (1994, p. 8) is as follows: Afghanistan (1978), Alge- 
ria (1962), Angola (1975), Benin (1972), Bolivia (1952), Burkina Faso (1983), Burma (1962), 
Cambodia (1975),  China (1949),  Cuba (1959),  Egypt  (1952),  Ethiopia  (1974),  Grenada 
(1979), Guinea-Bissau (1974), Laos (1975), North Korea (1948), South Yemen (1967), Viet- 
nam (1945). The Iranian revolution (1979) was inspired by Islamic, not Marxist, principles. 
31.  Colburn (1994, p. 103). 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
ical power both relative to competing domestic  interest groups (such as 
guilds and local gentry) and other nations.32  In this view, it is no accident 
that Alexander Hamilton championed trade protection in his "Report on 
the Subject of Manufactures," delivered to the U.S.  Congress in 1790, or 
that Friedrich List championed industrial policy in the period just before 
German unification.33 Both  men  saw  such  policies  as  a part of  state 
building. 
In the post-World  War II world,  the founding fathers of the newly 
independent industrial economies  almost all viewed  state-managed de- 
velopment  in political as well as economic  terms, and specifically  as a 
way to foster national unity and the political power of the national gov- 
ernment.  Thus,  Sukharno of Indonesia,  Nehru  of India, Nkrumah of 
Ghana, and Nyerere  of Tanzania were as concerned  about the political 
consolidation  of power as about economic  strategy per se.  Moreover, 
in many of these countries,  independence  had been the result of a long 
struggle with the imperial power during which the rallying cry of self- 
sufficiency had often played a key role in mobilizing the population. Pro- 
tectionist trade policies and barriers to foreign direct investment seemed 
to be a vital way to bolster newly won claims of independence. 
Trade and industrial policy  played an even  more direct role in state 
building when countries used such policies  to build up a military-indus- 
trial establishment.  In Russia and the Soviet  Union, for example,  from 
Peter the Great to Stalin the principle aim of heavy industrialization was 
to  bolster  the  military potential  of  the  state.  Similar considerations 
played  a role  in  many  other  countries  after  World War II,  such  as 
Nehru's  India and Nasser's  Egypt.34 
POLITICAL  ECONOMY.  Most recent models of trade policy have 
been based  on interest-group politics.35 Trade policy  is viewed  as the 
outcome of the relative political strengths of various factional, class,  or 
sectoral interests.  Such political considerations  have  surely played an 
important role in the SLI strategies of developing  countries,  but more 
often in the perpetuation of policies than in their onset. John Waterbury 
gives a careful, detailed account of state-led industrialization in Egypt, 
India, Mexico,  and Turkey,  showing that ideology,  state building, and 
32.  Heckscher (1955). 
33.  See Hamilton (1790) and List (1837). 
34.  See Waterbury (1993, pp. 69-70). 
35.  See, for example, Magee (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  19 
geopolitics,  rather than domestic interest groups, were the fundamental 
forces  that initially led to SLI.36 Once SLI policies  had built up a pro- 
tected  sector,  however,  powerful interest groups developed  to defend 
them. 
In many cases,  protectionist  policies  had their roots in the enforced 
autarky of the Great Depression  and World War II. Latin America, we 
have already noted,  swung from open trade to protection after the col- 
lapse of its export markets in the early 1930s. A domestic  import-com- 
peting sector arose naturally in the  1930s and 1940s, while at the same 
time, the wealth and power of the free-trade supporters, the large land- 
owners  and mineowners,  were  sapped by the collapse  of the terms of 
trade.  In the  immediate  postwar  era,  the  import-competing  sectors, 
which now faced the threat of renewed  trade competition,  added their 
voices  to other forces lobbying in support of state-led, autarkic policies. 
Similarly, in India, many of the key industrial backers of Nehru's  Con- 
gress Party had vested  interests in the licensing arrangements and pro- 
tectionism  that had been instituted by Britain as part of wartime con- 
trols. 
In sub-Saharan Africa,  the  story was  similar: wartime controls  on 
agriculture became postwar mechanisms of a profound anti-export bias. 
As P. T. Bauer brilliantly explained in his early critique of African agri- 
cultural monopoly  boards,  West African  Trade,  the origins of the mar- 
keting board arrangements are found in British wartime policy  objec- 
tives: 
The first  was to deny supplies  to the enemy and to secure them for the Allies, 
particularly  the United Kingdom.  The second objective  was the prevention  of a 
collapse  of the local price  of cocoa. The third  principle  objective  was to increase 
exports  of groundnuts  and  of oil palm  produce  after 1942.  There  were also three 
principal  elements  in the machinery  of export  control.  The first  was licensing  of 
exports to direct these to specific destinations.  The second was statutory  mo- 
nopoly  in the handling  of the principle  exports. The third  element  was a system 
of quotas  in the purchase  of export  produce.37 
Bauer and Robert Bates explain how these original intentions were later 
subverted  into  very  different  aims:  the  expansion  of  bureaucratic 
power; the enhancement  of government  tax revenues  through the mo- 
36.  Waterbury (1993, p. 10) writes that "for most of the period under scrutiny for each 
of the cases,  the state has enjoyed considerable autonomy from any constellation  of class 
actors." 
37.  Bauer (1954, p. 246). 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
nopoly purchases of agricultural output at below-market prices; and the 
tilt of the internal terms of trade in favor of urban (largely government) 
workers, and away from peasant cultivators.38 
The  basic  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  (HOS)  and  Ricardo-Viner 
(RV) models of trade give  some notion of which economic  groups in a 
society  should favor trade protection  (either import taxation or export 
taxation),  and which  should lean toward open trade. According  to the 
HOS model, the move from autarky to trade favors the abundant factors 
of production and reduces the real income of the scarce factors of pro- 
duction. Thus the relatively scarce factors of production in an economy 
should tend to be in favor of autarkic policies.  The RV theory highlights 
the implications of factor immobility between  sectors.  When capital or 
labor cannot move between sectors,  the immobile factors should tend to 
favor protection for their own sector, irrespective of the overall scarcity 
or abundance of specific factors of production.  Firms with sunk capital 
in the import-competing sector,  and workers with skills specific to that 
sector,  should tend to favor protection of the sector. 
Ronald Rogowski  and others have examined  relative factor intensi- 
ties to assess the pressures for and against free trade in the postwar era.39 
Most of the Asian economies  tend to have high labor-to-land ratios (land 
is the scarce factor),  suggesting that workers would tend to favor free 
trade (in order to benefit from the export of labor-intensive  goods  and 
the import of inexpensive  food),  while landowners would tend to favor 
protection  (to raise  the price  of foodstuffs  in the local  economy).  In 
Latin America and Africa, where labor is scarce and land is abundant, 
we would expect  the reverse: landowners  should be on the side of free 
trade (to raise the export price of foodstuffs),  and urban workers should 
be interested in protection (against the import of labor-intensive  goods 
and the export of foodstuffs). 
Of course,  the relative  power  of  the various  interests  to  influence 
trade policy  will depend on a myriad factors,  including the capacity  of 
competing groups to organize politically and the institutions for political 
competition  (for example,  elections  or military rule). In Latin America 
from the 1950s to the 1980s, for example,  protectionism tended to be fa- 
vored during democratic periods, since workers (who, as the scarce fac- 
tor, favored  protection)  could  outvote  landowners;  free trade, on the 
38.  See Bauer (1954) and Bates (1988). 
39.  Rogowski (1989). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  21 
other hand, was typically promoted by authoritarian governments,  sid- 
ing with large landowners and mineowners.40 In many parts of the devel- 
oping world, especially  Latin America and Africa, political power has 
been disproportionately concentrated in urban areas, thereby adding to 
the political weight of labor relative to landowners and turning the trade 
regime more protectionist.41 
It might seem that a labor-intensive economy would tend to lean more 
readily toward free trade than would a land-intensive (or resource-inten- 
sive) economy.  Postwar governments  have tended to respond more to 
labor interests  than landowner  interests,  whether  as the result of the 
search for votes,  or the fear of labor unrest, or the urban bias promoted 
by government-sector  workers.  If labor interests  are indeed the deter- 
mining factor, then trade liberalization would come more readily in Asia 
than in Latin America or Africa.  But as already noted,  interest group 
politics has hardly been decisive.  Some labor-intensive economies,  such 
as  the  South  Asian  countries  (India,  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  and  Sri 
Lanka) were  long protectionist,  while  labor-scarce  Chile became  the 
first sustained free trader in Latin America (although, notably, under a 
military regime). 
The Classification  and Timing of Trade Policies 
The outcome of these various forces produced an overwhelming turn 
toward socialism  or SLI in the developing  world during the  1940s and 
1950s, which  was  only  gradually reversed  over  the next  forty  years. 
According to our classifications,  shown in tables 1-5,  seventy-eight  de- 
veloping  countries  outside  of the Soviet  bloc  chose  some  form of in- 
ward-looking  development  strategy  in the  postwar  period.  Of these, 
forty-three had opened their economies  by 1994 (see table 2) and thirty- 
five were still closed as of 1994 (see table 3). Although developed  coun- 
tries typically  started open and remained open throughout the period, 
40.  One example is Peru, which maintained open trade during the Odria dictatorship, 
between  1948 and 1956. Trade remained relatively free during the democratic presidency 
of Manuel Prado (1956-63),  but then turned gradually more protectionist under Fernando 
Belaunde Terry (1963-68).  Peru finally embarked on autarkic, socialist  policies  under a 
left-wing military dictatorship led by Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75).  Conversely,  it was 
the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile after 1973 which ended decades  of protectionism.  For 
details, see Skidmore and Smith (1984). 
41.  See Lipton (1976) and Bates (1981). 22  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Table 1.  Developing Economies That Have Always Been Opena 
Country  Year  of independence 
Barbados  1966 
Cyprus  1960 
Hong Kong  not applicable 
Malaysia  1963 
Mauritius  1968 
Singapore  1965 
Thailand  never colonizt-d 
Yemen  Arab Republic  1918 
Source:  See  appendix. 
a.  Since  independence,  where applicable. 
we have found eight other developing  countries that followed  this pat- 
tern (see table 1) and thirteen that had episodes  of temporary liberaliza- 
tion (these periods are identified in parentheses in tables 1-5). 
A parallel process  of liberalization was underway in the developed 
economies,  although integration was typically achieved in the 1950s and 
1960s, rather than the  1980s and 1990s (see  table 4). Note  that for the 
purposes of this paper, we define developed  economies  as all countries 
with a real GDP of $5,000 or more in 1970, according to the purchasing- 
power adjusted data in Summers and Heston.42 This criterion results in 
a few classifications  that are not standard, namely that Ireland, Greece, 
and Portugal are classified as developing  countries,  while Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela  are classified  as developed.  But these  unusual 
classifications  have little impact on our main conclusions. 
Our categorization and timing of trade liberalization are fundamental 
to tables 1-5 and the subsequent empirical work. We judge a country to 
have a closed trade policy if it has at least one of the following character- 
istics: 
1.  Nontariff barriers (NTBs) covering 40 percent or more of trade. 
2.  Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more. 
3.  A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or 
more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s 
or 1980s. 
4.  A socialist economic  system (as defined by Kornai).43 
5.  A state monopoly on major exports. 
42.  Summers and Heston (1991). 
43.  Kornai (1992). Table 2.  Developing Economies That Had Opened by 1994 after Initial Closure 
Pr ior- macroeconomic  cri  isis 
Exter-nal  External 
Year of  payments  debt  High 
Count3,y  opening'  arrears  r-esc  hedulintg  itiflationi  b  Relnar ks 
Greece  1959  No  crisis 
Portugal  1960  No  crisis 
Taiwan  1963  Foreign aid 
reduction 
Jordan  1965  No  crisis 
Ireland  1966  No  crisis 
Korea,  Republic  1968  Foreign aid 
reduction 
Indonesia  1970  Yes  Yes  1964 
Chile  1976  1973 
Botswana  1979  No crisis 
Morocco  1984  (1956-64)  1987  1983 
Bolivia  1985  (1956-78)  1987  1980  1982 
Gambia  1985  1987  1986 
Ghana  1985  1987  1981 
Costa Rica  1986  (1952-61)  1987  1983 
Guinea  1986  1987  1986 
Mexico  1986  1983  1983 
Guinea-Bissau  1987  1987  1987 
Guatemala  1988  (1950-61)  1987  1993 
Guyana  1988  1987  1982 
Jamaica  1988  (1962-73)  1987  1981 
Mali  1988  1987  1988 
Philippines  1988  1989  1984 
Uganda  1988  1987  1981  1985 
El Salvador  1989  (1950-61)  1987  1990 
Paraguay  1989  1987 
Tunisia  1989  Terms-of- 
trade decline 
Turkey  1989  1980  1980 
Benin  1990  1987  1988 
Uruguay  1990  1983  1990 
Argentina  1991  1989 
Brazil  1991  1987  1983  1981 
Colombia  1991  No  crisis 
Ecuador  1991  (1950-83)  1988  1983 
Honduras  1991  (1950-61)  1987  1987 
Nepal  1991  No  crisis 
Nicaragua  1991  (1950-60)  1987  1980  1985 
Peru  1991  (1948-67)  1987  1980  1983 
South Africa  1991  1987  1985 
Sri Lanka  1991  (1950-56)(1977-83)  No  crisis 
Cameroon  1993  (1963-67)  1990  1989 
Kenya  1993  1993 
Zambia  1993  1987  1983  1989 
India  1994  No  crisis 
Source:  External  payments  arrears,  the  variable  EPA,  are  recorded  in  IMF,  Annual  Repo-t  on? Exchange 
Restrictions,  various  issues.  External  debt rescheduling,  the variable DC,  is recorded  in World Bank (1994c).  See 
appendix for complete  definitions of variables and sources. 
a.  Dates  in parentheses  identify temporary liberalizations. 
b.  High inflation, the variable Hi,  indicates  annual inflation exceeding  100 percent. 
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Table 3.  Developing Economies That Were Closed at the End of 1994a 
Algeria  Ethiopia  Pakistan 
Angola  Gabon  Papua New  Guinea 
Bangladesh  Haiti  Rwanda 
Burkina Faso  Iran  Senegal 
Burundi  Iraq  Sierra Leone 
Central African Republic  Madagascar  Somalia 
Chad  Malawi  Syrian Arab Republic (1951-65) 
China  Mauritania  Tanzania 
Congo  Mozambique  Togo 
Cote d'Ivoire  Myanmar  Zaire 
Dominican  Republic  Niger  Zimbabwe 
Egypt  Nigeria 
Source:  See  appendix. 
a.  Dates  in parentheses  identify  temporary liberalizations. 
We define an open economy  as one in which none of the five condi- 
tions applies. The basic trade data are shown in table 6. Details on data 
sources and other data adjustments are given in the appendix. Note that 
the tariff and nontariff barriers are for the mid-1980s. We have also ex- 
amined the time series of tariff and nontariff barriers through an inde- 
pendent literature review  (also described in the appendix) to judge the 
timing of the shift from closed to open trade. 
In tables  1-5 the date of trade liberalization is taken to be the year 
from which the economy  is open continuously  through the end of the 
sample period, 1994.44  For most economies  the postwar era is character- 
ized by initial closure  (failure on one or more of the five criteria listed 
above), followed by subsequent opening. For these temporary liberaliz- 
ers,  the date of opening is taken to be the date at which the openness 
criteria are finally met without subsequent reversal up to 1994 (in effect, 
ignoring the initial temporary episode of openness).  We show below that 
44.  Our choice of dating is surely subject to further refinement. Our chosen criteria are 
useful and objective indicators of trade policy,  but we recognize that they are too simplis- 
tic. The threshold levels  (such as a 20 percent black market premium) are arbitrary, and 
the measurements do not account for the general-equilibrium effects  of an array of trade 
policies.  For example,  we use nominal tariff rates rather than effective  protection rates, 
and we do not consider the role of export subsidies  in offsetting  import protection.  The 
quantification of nontariff barriers is also inherently difficult. Perhaps most difficult was 
judging the year in which openness  is first achieved.  We relied on a wide array of second- 
ary sources,  which sometimes  contradicted  each other.  Despite  all of these  difficulties, 
we still believe  that our measures  of openness  and the timing of liberalization convey  a 
substantial amount of information, though with inevitable error. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  25 
Table 4.  Developed Economies with Year of Opening 
Year  of 
Countiy  openinga 
Australia  1964 
Austria  1960 
Belgium  1960 
Canada  1952 
Denmark  1960 
Finland  1960 
France  1959 
Germany  1959 
Israel  1985 
Italy  1959 
Japan  1962 
Luxembourg  1959 
Netherlands  1959 
New  Zealand  1986 
Norway  1960 
Spain  1960 
Sweden  1960 
Switzerland  1950 or earlier 
Trinidad and Tobago  closed 
United  Kingdom  1960 
United  States  1950 or earlier 
Venezuela  (1950-59)  (1989-92) 
Source:  See  appendix. 
a.  Dates  in parentheses  identify temporary liberalizations. 
the periods  of  temporary openness  were  often  characterized  by  sus- 
tained economic  growth at a higher level than during the subsequent pe- 
riod of closure.  Finally,  in table 5 we show the liberalization record of 
the  post-socialist  European  economies,  but  in  this  case  we  rely  on 
EBRD standards of openness. 
The five criteria are chosen  in order to cover all of the major types of 
trade restriction. Tariffs and nontariff barriers (mainly quotas) are most 
obvious. We rely mainly on UNCTAD  data for these classifications.  The 
black market premium (BMP) is a measure of exchange control: a large 
BMP is evidence  of the rationing of foreign exchange,  which tends to be 
a form of import control. The socialist classification is used as an indica- 
tor to cover countries like Poland and Hungary, which relied on central 
planning rather than overt trade policies  (for example,  tariffs) to main- 
tain a closed  economy.  Export  controls  are symmetrical  with import 
controls in their effects  on closing an economy,  as A. P. Lerner first es- 26  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Table 5.  Post-communist Countries with Year of Opening 
Yeas  of 
Countuy  opening 
Hungary  1990 
Poland  1990 
Bulgaria  1991 
Czech  Republic  1991 
Slovak  Republic  1991 
Slovenia  1991 
Albania  1992 
Estonia  1992 
Romania  1992 
Croatia  1993 
Latvia  1993 
Lithuania  1993 
Belarus  1994 
Kyrgyzstan  1994 
FYR Macedonia  1994 
Moldova  1994 
Armenia  closed 
Azerbaijan  closed 
Georgia  closed 
Kazakhstan  closed 
Russia  closed 
Tajikistan  closed 
Turkmenistan  closed 
Ukraine  closed 
Uzbekistan  closed 
Yugoslavia  closed 
Source:  European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (1994). 
tablished.45  The sub-Saharan African countries relied extensively  on ex- 
port monopolies  on foodstuffs,  in part to maintain low domestic  prices 
of food for urban residents. 
Returning to tables 1-5, we show that only a few developing countries 
have been continuously  open from the start of the postwar era, or from 
the start of their independence:  Barbados, Cyprus, Hong King, Malay- 
sia,  Mauritius,  Singapore,  Thailand,  and the  Yemen  Arab Republic. 
Many others embarked on a path of inward-oriented growth in the 1950s 
or 1960s that was subsequently  reversed in the 1970s or later. (Bolivia, 
Ecuador,  and Jamaica closed  quite late in the period:  1978, 1983, and 
1973, respectively.)  Some  of the first closed  economies  to open  trade 
were three East Asian countries:  Taiwan (1963), South Korea  (1968), 
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Table 7.  Trade Policy Indicators for Asian Economies 
Black  market  Black  market  Quota  Average 
Country  premium (1970s)a  premium  (1980S)b  coveragec  tariffJU 
Hong  Kong  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Korea  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.14 
Singapore  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02 
Taiwan  0.05  0.06  0.38  0.07 
Indonesia  0.03  0.04  0.10  0.14 
Malaysia  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.09 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.29 
All developing  countries 
Median  0.17  0.18  0.14  0.19 
Mean  0.44  0.70  0.26  0.22 
Source:  See  appendix for complete  definitions of variables and sources. 
a.  The variable BMP70,  measuring the black market exchange  premium, averaged over the  1970s. 
b.  The variable BMP80,  measuring the black market exchange  premium, averaged over  the  1980s. 
c.  The variable OWQI, indicating coverage  of quotas on imports of intermediates  and capital goods. 
d.  The variable OWTI, indicating average tariffs on imports of intermediates  and capital goods. 
and Indonesia (1970). It has become fashionable to argue that East Asian 
countries are not really open or market-oriented, and that, in fact, they 
systematically  "got the prices wrong" to spur industrial growth.46 It is 
surely true that Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia are not laissez  faire, but 
they and their neighbors in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Malaysia, have 
been more open to trade than other developing  countries,  based on ob- 
jective  indicators of trade policy,  shown in table 7. All of the East Asian 
economies  have low or zero BMPs; all but Thailand have low tariff rates; 
and all but Taiwan have low NTB coverage.  Moreover,  the Thai tariffs 
and the Taiwanese NTBs are moderate, not extreme. 
In a later paper we intend to specify a detailed model of the timing of 
liberalization during the postwar period. Here we simply test a few of the 
simplest propositions  that arise from political economy  considerations: 
that timing should be related to the relative endowments  of labor and 
land, the size of the economy,  the per capita income,  and perhaps the 
previous political history (for example,  number of years since indepen- 
dence). As described above, we would expect the transition to openness 
to be faster  in land-scarce  and labor-abundant economies,  since  it is 
plausible that governments will tend to be more responsive  to the inter- 
ests  of labor over landowners.  We would also expect  the transition to 
46.  See Wade (1990) with regard to Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, 
and Amsden (1989) with regard to South Korea. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  33 
openness  to be earlier in less populous economies,  since the gains from 
trade are presumably larger for an economy  with a small domestic  mar- 
ket. We would also expect that countries that begin the postwar era with 
a high per capita income would be more likely to liberalize, because of a 
higher initial level of division of labor and degree of specialization within 
the  economy.  Finally,  we  would  expect  that  postcolonial  countries 
would be less likely to liberalize (because of the "imperatives" of nation- 
building) than countries that have long been independent. 
To test these propositions,  we estimate the following logit model: 
(1)  Pr(TLj  =  1) =  exp(B'Xj)/[1  +  exp(B'Xi)], 
where TLi  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country i liberalized between 
1955 and 1970, and equal to 0 if the country did not liberalize before 1970. 
There are sixteen developing countries for which TLi =  1. The vector of 
Xs includes: the land-to-population ratio in 1960 as a proxy for the land- 
to-labor ratio, the population in 1960, the per capita GDP in 1970, and a 
dummy variable for postcolonial  status (equal to 1 if independent before 
1945). We also include a dummy variable if the country is a British Com- 
monwealth country, and another dummy variable if it is a former French 
colony,  on the grounds that the type of colonial relationship might affect 
the timing of postcolonial  trade liberalization.47 Our sample includes all 
countries with GDP per capita of less than $5,000 in 1970. 
The results are shown in table 8. As expected,  we find statistical evi- 
dence  that a high population-to-land  ratio raised the probability of an 
early trade liberalization. This fact helps to account for the early liberal- 
ization  in much  of  Southeast  Asia.  Similarly,  high-income  countries 
tended to liberalize ahead of low-income  countries.  Surprisingly, size of 
population did not prove to be significant. We also see that not a single 
former French colony  opened to trade during the period 1955-70. Sev- 
eral former British colonies  did open to trade, but several others did not. 
The dummy variable for British Commonwealth  status was not statisti- 
cally significant. 
Liberalization  Episodes  in the 1950s and 1960s 
While the typical developing country started out as a closed economy 
and liberalized later, we have identified fifteen countries that had an ini- 
47.  For example,  liberalization of former French colonies  in Africa has tended to be 
delayed because of overvalued exchange  rates in the French franc zone. 34  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
Table 8.  Logit Regressions to Explain Timing of Liberalization in Developing Countriesa 
Independent  variable  Estimated  coefficient  Significance  level 
Population in 1960b  -0.000  [0.699] 
Population/land  in  1960c  9.520  [0.024] 
GDP  in  1970d  0.0007  [0.040] 
Postcoloniale  -  0.665  [0.571] 
British Commonwealthf  -  0.237  [0.815] 
Summary statistic 
Sample size  72 
Source:  Authors'  regressions,  using data described  in the appendix. 
a.  The  regression  model  is from equation  1 of the text.  We created  a dummy variable,  TL, that takes  the value 
1.0 if a developing  country  opened  by  1970 and stayed  open.  The  logit specification  then estimates  a model  where 
prob [TLj =  1] =  exp  (I Xj)/[1  +  exp  (1Xj)], where  the Xs  are the independent  variables.  These  regressions  were 
originally estimated  with a variable that measured whether the country was a French colony.  This variable perfectly 
predicted not opening (no former French colony  opened  before  1970), so the model above  is estimated  without these 
fifteen countries.  To assess  the fit of the estimated  model,  note that of the fifty-six countries  that did not open,  fifty- 
five had predicted probabilities of opening of less than 0.5. Of the sixteen countries that did open,  seven  had predicted 
probabilities of more than 0.5. 
b.  The variable POP60,  measuring population in 1960 in thousands. 
c.  The variable POP60/LAND,  measuring population in 1960 in thousands,  divided by land area in square meters. 
d.  The variable GDP70. 
e.  The dummy variable OLDS,  set equal to one for countries  that achieved  independence  before World War 11. 
f.  The dummy variable CW, set equal to one for countries  in the British Commonwealth. 
Table 9.  Growth Rates during and after Temporary Liberalization Episodes 
Percent 
Trade policy  Average  per capita  growth 
Countiy  Open  Closed  Open  Closed 
Boliviaa  1956-78  1979-85  2.49  -  2.52 
Costa Rica  1952-61  1962-86  3.39  1.84 
Ecuadorb  1950-82  1983-91  2.64  -  0.31 
El Salvador  1950-61  1962-89  1.72  0.93 
Guatemala  1950-61  1962-88  0.86  0.91 
Honduras  1950-61  1962-91  0.49  1.22 
Jamaica  1962-73  1974-88  4.15  -  0.65 
Kenya  1963-67  1968-92  2.94  1.67 
Morocco  1956-64  1965-84  4.15  2.14 
Nicaragua  1950-60  1961-91  7.20  0.55 
Peru  1948-67  1968-91  3.51  -  0.64 
Sri Lankac  1950-56  1957-77  0.48  1.23 
Syria  1951-65  1966-92  6.51  3.16 
Turkey  1950-53  1954-89  11.67  2.40 
Venezuelad  1950-59  1960-89  3.88  -  0.45 
Source:  Authors'  calculations,  using real per capita growth  data taken from version  5.6 of the data contained  in 
Summers and Heston  (1991), and the country  sources  described  in the appendix. 
a.  A reasonable argument can be made to classify  Bolivia as open from 1956 to 1968, rather than to  1978; in which 
case  average growth during the open  period would be 2.41. 
b.  A  reasonable  argument can  be  made to  classify  Ecuador  as open  from  1950 to  1970, rather than to  1982; in 
which case  average growth during the open period would be 2.04. 
c.  Sri Lanka also  had a temporary liberalization episode  in 1977-83,  during which growth was 5.37. 
d.  Venezuela  also  had a temporary liberalization episode  in 1989-92,  during which growth was 6.17. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  35 
tial episode  of temporary liberalization.  In almost all cases,  these  are 
countries that had a tradition of open trade, which was resurrected im- 
mediately following the Second World War. Table 9 lists these countries 
and the  dates  of  the  temporary  liberalization  as  well  as  the  average 
growth rates, both during the open period and the subsequent closed pe- 
riod. We find that in twelve  of the fifteen cases,  average growth in the 
open period exceeded  that in the subsequent closed  period. This is im- 
portant because  it suggests that the eventual decision to close  the econ- 
omy was generally not caused by slow growth during the open period, 
but rather by political and ideological  shifts within each country. This is 
corroborated  by  economic  histories  of  these  countries,  which  rarely 
give  slow growth as a reason for the policy  switch.  In the notes  to the 
table, we also report high average growth rates in two later temporary 
liberalizations, in Sri Lanka and Venezuela.  Overall, we find little direct 
evidence  that slow growth played an important role in ending these epi- 
sodes of liberalization. 
The Impact  of Postwar  Global  Integration  on Economic 
Performance,  1970-89 
In this section  we show that during the period 1970-89 open econo- 
mies outperformed closed  economies  on three main dimensions  of eco- 
nomic performance: economic  growth, avoidance  of extreme macroec- 
onomic crises, and structural change. In the process we demonstrate the 
close  relationship between  economic  integration and economic  conver- 
gence,  that is, poor countries tend to grow faster than richer countries, 
as long as the poor and rich countries are linked together by international 
trade. Poor,  closed  economies  have often performed significantly less 
well than the richer countries. 
For the purposes of this section, we define a country as open if it satis- 
fies the five policy criteria for the duration of the 1970s and 1980s. Coun- 
tries that were closed during part of this period but subsequently liberal- 
ized are treated as closed  economies.  In the following  section,  we pick 
up the trail of those economies  by examining the effects of relatively late 
trade liberalization on economic  performance. 
Openness  and Growth 
During 1970-89, we find a strong association  between  openness  and 
growth, both within the group of developing and the group of developed 36  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Table 10.  Developing Country Growth and Openness,  197089a 
Always  Not  always 
Growth rate'  open  open 
Average  growth 
>3.0  1  1  4 
Average  growth 
<3.0  4  70 
Source:  See  appendix. 
a.  In a test of independence  the chi square is 41 (significance  level  =  0.000). 
b.  The growth variable is G7089, the real annual per capita growth in GDP over  1970-89, described in the appendix. 
countries.  Within the group of developing  countries,  the open  econo- 
mies grew at 4.49 percent per year, and the closed  economies  grew at 
0.69 percent  per year.  Within the group of developed  economies,  the 
open economies  grew at 2.29 percent per year, and the closed economies 
grew at 0.74 percent per year.48 
We may also classify  the data in a different way to focus  on growth 
within the open  and closed  groups.  Within the closed  group, average 
growth is about the same for the poorer developing  countries (0.69 per- 
cent) as the richer developed  countries (0.74 percent). However,  within 
the group of open economies,  the developing countries grew faster (4.49 
percent) than the developed  countries (2.29 percent). This suggests that 
within the group of open economies,  both developing and developed,  we 
should tend to observe  economic  convergence.  Another way to look at 
this is provided by table 10 which shows  the frequency of growth rates 
above  and below  3 percent  per year for closed  and open  developing 
countries.  Eleven of the fifteen open economies  grew at more than 3 per- 
cent  per  year,  while  only  four  of  seventy-four  closed  economies 
achieved such growth. For this cross-tabulation,  x2 = 41 (p < 0.000), so 
that we may reject the null hypothesis  of no difference  in growth rates 
between the closed and open economies. 
Figure 2 shows  the average annual growth rates for a group of forty 
always-closed  developing  economies  and a group of eight always-open 
developing  economies  during the period  1965-90.  As can be seen,  the 
48.  Four  developed  economies  were  closed  for  part  of  the  period:  Israel,  New 
Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.  While three of these countries are not nor- 
mally classified  as developed,  on a purchasing power parity basis,  their per capita GDP 
exceeded  $5,000 in 1970, and thus they qualify as developed  by the standard used in this 
paper. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  37 
Figure 2.  Average Growth of Eight Always Open and Forty Always Closed Economies, 
1966-90 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using version  5.6 of the data in Summers and Heston  (1991). 
a.  Figure shows  three-year  moving averages. 
always-open  economies  outperformed the always-closed  economies  in 
every  year.  The open economies  were clearly more susceptible  to the 
external shocks  of the first half of the 1970s (the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods, worldwide inflation, and the OPEC oil price increases),  but then 
bounced back. Note that the average per capita growth rates of the open 
economies  at the end of the 1980s was about the same as during the sec- 
ond half of the 1960s, around 5 or 6 percent per year. The closed econo- 
mies, by contrast, evidence  a long-term slowdown  in growth (2 or 3 per- 
cent  per year in the late  1960s, around 0 percent  per year in the late 
1980s). 
The data suggest that the absence of overall convergence  in the world 
economy  during the past few decades  might well result from the closed 
trading regimes of most of the poorer countries.  We now investigate the 
issue of convergence  in greater detail. Our starting point is figure 3. We 
graph on the x-axis  the  1970 level  of per capita GDP of our sample of 
countries and on the y-axis, the growth of per capita GDP for 1970-89.49 
49.  The exact definitions of the data and the selection  of countries are described in the 
appendix. 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 3.  Growth and Initial Income, All Economies,  1970-89 
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Source:  Version  5.5 of the data in Summers and Heston  (1991) and World Bank (1994d). 
If convergence  predominated in the data, then there would be a negative 
relationship between  initial income in 1970 and subsequent  growth be- 
tween  1970 and 1989. No  such tendency  is found overall in the world 
economy.  Many poor countries,  particularly those  in sub-Saharan Af- 
rica, not only fail to grow faster than the rich countries; they in fact expe- 
rience negative per capita growth, so that the gap between  these coun- 
tries and the rich countries widens significantly. 
When Paul  Romer  first introduced  the  conundrum  of  nonconver- 
gence to the economics  profession in his path-breaking 1986 analysis, he 
suggested that it might be due to the fundamental nature of economic 
growth.50 Romer showed  that if production  is subject to spillovers  of 
knowledge  in the production process,  so that learning or skills devel- 
oped in one part of the economy  raise the productivity of other parts of 
50.  Romer (1986). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  39 
the economy,  then the aggregate economy  may be freed from the dimin- 
ishing marginal productivity of capital that is characteristic of standard 
production processes.  In this case,  the rich countries could continue to 
stay ahead of the poor countries,  since their higher income would reflect 
higher levels  of learning or human skills, which in turn would raise the 
future productivity of capital. 
Romer's  hypothesis,  while  intriguing, seems  to be contradicted  by 
other data, which show convergence  within more restricted subsamples 
of economies.  For example,  Steve Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen  show 
that the advanced economies  of the Organisation for Economic  Co-op- 
eration and Development  (OECD) displayed  strong tendencies  of con- 
vergence  in the postwar period, with the relatively poor OECD econo- 
mies tending to grow more rapidly than the richer economies,  thereby 
closing the proportionate income gap. Similarly, Williamson and associ- 
ates in several studies find evidence  for convergence  among the leading 
economies  during the period of internationalization  at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin find strong 
evidence  of convergence  in living standards among U.S.  states and Jap- 
anese  prefectures.  Dan Ben-David  shows  strong convergence  among 
the members of the European Community and the European Free Trade 
Area, with the dispersion  of income falling as trade liberalization pro- 
ceeded.51 
The contrasting evidence  has given rise to two related hypotheses. 
William Baumol and others have suggested that there may be a conver- 
gence  club,  meaning a subset  of countries  for which convergence  ap- 
plies,  while countries outside of the club would not necessarily  experi- 
ence  convergence  relative to those  within it: "It also  seems  clear that 
convergence  does  not  apply  to  the  poorest  of  the  world  economies, 
though the line separating those eligible for membership in the conver- 
gence  club and those  foreclosed  from membership has not been deter- 
mined definitively."52 Baumol suggests that only countries with an ade- 
quate initial level  of human capital endowments  can take advantage of 
modern technology  to enjoy convergent growth. He therefore speaks of 
the "advantages of moderate backwardness," arguing that while middle- 
income developing  countries can take advantage of their lag in technol- 
51.  See  Dowrick  and  Nguyen  (1989),  Williamson  (1992),  Barro and  Sala-i-Martin 
(1991), and Ben-David (1993). 
52.  Baumol, Nelson,  and Wolff (1994, p. 82). 40  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
ogy to borrow from abroad, the poorest  countries are unable to bridge 
the gap in technology  and knowledge.53 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin have introduced the related notion of condi- 
tional convergence,  in which countries differ in their long-run per capita 
income  levels,  with  each  country  tending  to  grow  more  rapidly the 
greater is the gap between  its initial per capita income level and its own 
long-run per capita income  level.54 Formally,  country  i is assumed  to 
have the long-run per capita income level yi*, and initial per capita in- 
come level yi. The rate of growth, ji, is assumed to be an increasing func- 
tion of the gap between yi* and yi: 
(2)  Ys  =  -  (Yi*-Yi) 
A positive  value of B is said to signify conditional convergence.  In turn, 
yi* is proxied  by certain "structural" variables,  Zjfl such as the initial 
level'of human capital, according to an equation y,* =  EY]i  Z,i  Barro and 
others then estimate a regression equation of the form: 
(3)  yi =  B (EY1  zj> -  Y1) 
They tend to find a negative and significant coefficient for initial income, 
yi, and significant coefficients on several of the structural variables, Zi.55 
Like  Baumol,  Barro concludes  that "a poor country tends  to grow 
faster than a rich country, but only for a given quantity of human capital; 
that is, only if the poor country's human capital exceeds  the amount that 
typically  accompanies  the low level  of per capita income.  "156  More re- 
cently,  Robert Barro, Gregory Mankiw, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin state 
that the "substantially different steady states  .  .  . can reflect the effects 
of disparities in preferences and government policies on the saving rate, 
fertility, and the available production technology."57 
In summary, there have been three dominant explanations offered in 
53.  Baumol, Nelson,  and Wolff (1994, p. 65). 
54.  See Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992a). 
55.  The finding of conditional convergence  is now fairly well established in the empiri- 
cal literature. A number of studies have found this result using post-World  War II data 
with different conditioning  variables.  The list includes  Barro (1991), De Long and Sum- 
mers (1991), King and Levine (1993), Levine and Renelt (1992), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992), and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
56.  Barro (1991, p. 409). 
57.  Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 103). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  41 
the literature for the absence of convergence  shown in figure 3. The first 
holds that productive technology  is intrinsically kind to the technologi- 
cal leader: the rich tend to grow richer as a result of increasing returns 
to scale in one form or another.58  The second holds that convergence  is 
a fact of life, but only among countries with a sound human capital base 
for using modern technology.  The third holds that currently poor coun- 
tries have a low long-term potential income level (yi*), though countries 
do tend to grow faster the greater is the gap between  their current in- 
come and their own long-run potential. 
The first two  interpretations,  and possibly  the third, would be pro- 
foundly pessimistic  for the poorer countries  today,  since they  suggest 
that the poorer countries will be unable to close the gap with the richer 
countries. The conditional convergence  hypothesis is ambiguous on this 
fundamental point.  If the low  long-term potential  income  of the poor 
countries that it posits is due to preferences  and initial skill levels,  then 
it too  is profoundly pessimistic.  In this case  the hypothesis  is akin to 
Baumol's convergence  club. On the other hand, if the low long-term po- 
tential income  is due to bad policies,  then convergence  could  still be 
achieved by policy changes. 
We suggest that the most parsimonious reading of the evidence  is that 
convergence  can be achieved by all countries,  even those with low ini- 
tial levels  of skills, as long as they are open and integrated in the world 
economy.  In this  interpretation,  the  convergence  club  is the  club  of 
economies  linked together by international trade: thus the OECD,  the 
European Community, the late-nineteenth-century  economies,  the U.S. 
states,  and the Japanese prefectures  all tend to show  convergence.  In 
terms of the conditional convergence  hypothesis,  we argue that the ap- 
parent differences in long-term income levels  are not differences due to 
fundamental tastes  and technologies,  but rather to policies  regarding 
economic  integration. 
The role of policy  choices  in convergence  is dramatically evident  in 
figures 4 and 5, where we divide the sample in figure 3 into groups of 
open and closed economies.  Figure 4 shows that the open countries dis- 
play  a  strong  tendency  toward  economic  convergence,  and that the 
countries with initially low per capita income levels  grow more rapidly 
58.  Increasing returns to scale is shorthand for a wide variety of technological possibil- 
ities,  such  as learning by  doing,  spillovers  in knowledge  accumulation,  agglomeration 
economies  among suppliers of specialized  inputs to production, etc. 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 4.  Growth and Initial Income, Open Economies,  1970-89 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using version  5.5 of the data in Summers and Heston  (1991). 
than the richer countries.59 The closed  economies  in figure 5 do not dis- 
play  any tendency  toward convergence.  In fact,  they  are clearly  the 
source of the failure of convergence  noted in figure 3. Even more strik- 
ing, there is not a single country in our sample (which covers  111 coun- 
tries and approximately 98 percent of the non-communist world in 1970) 
which pursued open trade policies  during the entire period 1970-89 and 
yet had per capita growth of less than 1.2 percent per year (Switzerland 
had the lowest  growth,  at 1.24 percent).  And not a single open devel- 
oping country grew at less than 2 percent per year (Greece,  at 2.38 per- 
cent, and Jordan, at 2.58 percent, are the lowest)! 
59.  The open economies  also exhibit convergence  in the sense  of having a declining 
dispersion of GDP over time (sigma-convergence  in Barro and Sala-i-Martin's terminol- 
ogy).  For the open economies  the standard deviation of the log of GDP was 0.83 in 1970 
and 0.75 in 1989. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  43 
Figure 5.  Growth and Initial Income, Closed Economies,  1970-89 
Annual  growth 
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Source: Authors' calculations  using version 5.5 of the data in Summers and Heston  (1991) and World Bank (1994d). 
So far we  have analyzed  growth per capita  rather than growth per 
worker. The reason  is that per capita growth rates are available for a 
longer time span than the per worker growth rates, which often rely on 
less  frequent  census  data.  However,  since  some  theories  (the Solow 
model  in particular) predict  convergence  more precisely  in terms  of 
growth per worker,  it is worth examining  the available  data on  such 
growth. Figure 6 presents figure 4 redrawn with growth per worker on 
the y axis (covering the period 1970-85 rather than 1970-89). The nega- 
tive relation between  growth and initial income is more clearly evident 
in this figure than in figure 4.60  Based  on this evidence,  if growth per 
worker were  available for the full time period,  we would  expect  it to 
strengthen  our conclusions  regarding convergence,  but the  minimum 
60.  This result,  that per worker growth exhibits  stronger evidence  for convergence 
than per capita growth, is also observed by Wolf (1994). 44  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 6.  Growth Per Worker and Initial GDP Per Worker, Open Economies, 1970-85 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using versions  5 and 5.5 of the data in Summers and Heston  (1991). 
growth rate of the open group would be about 0 percent rather than 1.2 
percent.  We plan to examine this phenomenon  further when data from 
the 1990 census rounds become  available. 
In summary, we find no cases  to support the frequent worry that a 
country might open and yet fail to grow. Of course,  economic  reforms 
take time to work, so that some countries that adopted outward-oriented 
market reforms in the late 1980s or early 1990s might not yet be enjoying 
high growth rates as a result. We return to the growth effects  of recent 
reforms in the next major section of the paper. 
We also find little support for the idea that our results  might come 
from reverse  causality  or from sample  selection  bias.  We simply find 
very few examples of developing countries that started open, performed 
poorly, and closed as a result. The far more common case is that devel- 
oping countries started closed,  performed poorly, and then opened.  As Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  45 
emphasized  above,  most  developing  countries  started  out  as  closed 
economies.  And the few that had temporary episodes  of liberalization 
had high growth during the open period. It is therefore hard to argue that 
slow growth caused the turn to closed policies.  Rather, it seems that for 
reasons unrelated to growth performance, the developing world in 1970 
was sorted into a large group of closed  economies  and a much smaller 
group of open economies.  Twenty-five  years later, sufficient time has 
passed  for us to  see  the effects  of this fundamental policy  choice  on 
growth. 
Our evidence  so far suggests  that being open to international trade 
has been  sufficient to achieve  growth in excess  of 2 percent for devel- 
oping  countries.6'  What of  necessity?  Are  there  many countries  that 
closed  and yet achieved  high economic  growth? There are four devel- 
oping countries that are classified as closed during the period and yet had 
per  capita  growth  of  more  than  3 percent  per year  during  1970-89: 
Botswana,  China, Hungary, and Tunisia. 
Botswana  failed to qualify on the basis of its black market premium 
for the  1970s, but did qualify for the  1980s. It passed all other criteria. 
Overall, therefore, the policies  have been relatively open, especially  in 
the 1980s. Moreover, since around 80 percent of Botswana's  exports are 
diamonds, and a remarkably small proportion (less than 5 percent) of the 
labor force is in agriculture, Botswana  avoided the anti-agricultural bi- 
ases that affected most of sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is relatively  straightforward to account for Hungary and Tunisia. 
Their successful  growth is more apparent than real. Both countries pur- 
sued statist development  strategies that produced growth in the  1970s 
and financial crises in the 1980s and early 1990s. In both cases there was 
a serious downturn in growth at the end of the 1980s, as these financial 
crises hit the government. Considered over a slightly longer time period, 
these countries would not look like successes,  and therefore would not 
be anomalous. 
In our view, China is the only puzzle, although it is essentially  consis- 
tent with the importance of open trade. It is indeed true that China has 
violated most of the rules: high black market premiums on the yuan, ex- 
61.  Of course,  our indicators of openness  are associated  with other market-based re- 
form policies,  which makes it difficult to identify the precise contribution of trade as com- 
pared to other policies.  A more precise statement is that open policies together with other 
correlated policies were sufficient for growth in excess  of 2 percent during 1970-89. 46  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
tensive  reliance  on trade quotas,  and a socialist  ownership  structure. 
Nonetheless,  the  country  has  experienced  a boom.  We  believe  that 
China's success  is strongly related to its particular economic  structure 
at the onset of its market reforms at the end of the 1970s. 
In particular, China was  a very poor economy  in 1978, with three- 
quarters of the labor force  in peasant  farming. The essence  of Deng 
Xiaoping's reforms at the end of the 1970s was to free the peasant econ- 
omy from state controls,  even while maintaining the state's grip on the 
nonpeasant,  state-owned  sector  (which covered just  18 percent of the 
labor force).  With respect  to international trade, the economy  was es- 
sentially liberalized for nonstate firms, especially  those operating in the 
Special  Economic  Zones  (SEZ) in the coastal  areas.  Even  though the 
currency remained inconvertible,  and many state enterprises remained 
subject to rationing of imports, the nonstate enterprises (including joint 
ventures  and foreign firms) were generally  able to import their inputs 
nearly duty free, and to export processed  goods to world markets. The 
result was a remarkable export boom, based heavily on labor-intensive 
operations.  Shang-Jin Wei presents clear evidence  that trade liberaliza- 
tion played an important role in China's growth.62 
Thus, China's "two-track approach" (decontrol of the peasant sector 
and continued control of the state sector) was sufficient to unleash eco- 
nomic development  and a labor-intensive  export boom,  even though it 
did not solve the many problems of poor performance in the state-owned 
sector. Some analysts have also argued that its boom is fragile and could 
still be stopped by the macroeconomic  instability characteristic of many 
economies  part way between planning and a market economy.63 
We now turn briefly to a regression analysis,  to confirm and deepen 
these basic findings. Various regression estimates  are reported in table 
11, showing the relationship between  initial income in 1970 and subse- 
quent growth between  1970 and 1989. We see in regression 1 the absence 
62.  To quote his conclusions:  "I have found some clear evidence  that during 1980-90 
more exports are positively  associated  with higher growth rates across Chinese cities.  In 
the late 1980s, the contribution to growth comes mainly from foreign investment.  Further- 
more, the contribution of foreign investment comes in the form of technological  or mana- 
gerial spillovers across firms as opposed to an infusion of new capital. Finally, the superb 
growth rates of coastal areas relative to the national average can be entirely explained by 
their effective  use of exports and foreign investment."  (Wei, 1995, p. 74.) Also,  see Lardy 
(1994) for further discussion  of China's recent experience  with international trade. 
63.  See Sachs and Woo (1994) for further details of the two-track approach in China 
and the current macroeconomic  problems. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  47 
of convergence  for the entire sample of countries (the coefficient on ini- 
tial income is positive  rather than negative,  and is statistically insignifi- 
cant). In regression 2 we see the strong evidence  of convergence  within 
the set of open countries. The coefficient on initial income suggests that 
each percentage point rise in per capita income in 1970 reduces  subse- 
quent annual growth by 0.014 percentage points. Each doubling of 1970 
income  reduces  annual growth by 0.95  percentage  points  (=  ln(2)  x 
1.368). In regression 3, we confirm the absence  of convergence  among 
the nonqualifying countries. 
We have also found that this result on the importance of openness for 
growth is robust to the presence  of several other possible  explanatory 
variables.  In regressions  4 and 5 we illustrate this with Barro's growth 
regression,  since it is particularly well known.M4  In regression 4, we rep- 
licate the Barro regression on cross-country  growth for our sample and 
time period. We see it performs as expected,  showing conditional con- 
vergence  (a negative,  significant coefficient  on initial income),  positive 
(although not significant) effects  of educational attainment, positive  ef- 
fects  of the investment-to-GDP  ratio, and negative effects  of measures 
of political instability. 
Regression 5 estimates the same equation but includes a dummy vari- 
able for openness  (OPEN  =  0 for a closed economy,  1 for an open econ- 
omy).  When we add OPEN,  we find that the open economies  grow, on 
average,  by  2.45 percentage  points  more than the  closed  economies, 
with a highly statistically significant effect.  Comparing the rest of the re- 
gressors with the estimates  of regression 4, the effect of investment de- 
clines  and the initial education  levels  are even  less  significant. This is 
consistent  with our view that the growth rate over this period was deter- 
mined less  by initial human capital levels  than by policy  choices.  Our 
finding that openness  plays  an important role  in a Barro-style  cross- 
country growth equation is consistent  with much recent  research,  in- 
cluding work by Surgit Bhalla, J. Bradford De Long and Lawrence Sum- 
mers, David Dollar, and Ross Levine and David Renelt.65 Indeed, some 
64.  See Barro (1991). 
65.  See  Bhalla (1994), De Long and Summers (1991), Dollar (1992), and Levine  and 
Renelt (1992). More specifically,  De Long and Summers use several measures of outward 
orientation and price distortions.  Levine  and Renelt use the black market premium, the 
number of revolutions and coups, a socialist dummy, a civil liberties index, and measures 
of openness  based on Leamer (1988). These studies examine the marginal contribution of 
the variables on the right side of a regression  equation; none use these  variables to sort 
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of our data, such as the tariff and black market premium data, have been 
used in previous studies,  including those by Jong-Wha Lee and Levine 
and Renelt.66 Our treatment of these data differs from the earlier studies 
in two important ways:  first, by our construction  of a single indicator 
measure of openness  (built on several  underlying variables); and sec- 
ond,  by our examination  of growth performance  within  the  subset  of 
open economies,  as well as between closed and open economies.  To our 
knowledge,  no earlier studies have pointed out that corivergence applies 
to the worldwide  subset of open economies.67 
In regression  6, we add a dummy variable, POL, to account for ex- 
treme  political  conditions  detrimental  to  long-term  investment.  The 
variable POL takes a value of  1 when any of the following  conditions 
applies: 
-A  socialist  economic  structure, according to the list of countries 
compiled by Kornai.68 
-Extreme  domestic  unrest caused  by revolutions,  coups,  chronic 
civil unrest, or a prolonged war with a foreign country that is fought on 
domestic  territory. 
-Extreme  deprivation of civil and political rights, according to the 
Freedom House index reported by McMillan, Rausser, and Johnson.69 
We see that the POL variable is statistically  significant at the 10 per- 
cent  level  (t  =  1.986),  suggesting  that property  rights, freedom,  and 
safety from violence  are additional determinants of growth.70  This find- 
ing is in accord with other recent studies,  including work by A. S. Ales- 
ina and others,  Barro, Bhalla, and Jakob Svensson.71 In other regres- 
sions,  not  reported  here,  we  have  experimented  with  the  three 
individual items in the POL index, and have found that each one plays a 
role in the growth process. 
66.  See Lee (1993) and Levine and Renelt (1992). 
67.  Note  also that we find no evidence  for significant interactions between  the open- 
ness  variable  and the  other  regressors  that would  diminish  the  explanatory  power  of 
openness. 
68.  Kornai (1992). 
69.  McMillan, Rausser, and Johnson (1994). 
70.  Note,  however,  that the set of countries  with POL  =  1 is a subset  of the set of 
closed economies.  Therefore use of the POL variable as an additional criterion to classify 
countries would give the same set of countries as using the OPEN variable alone. The same 
is true for the set of countries that had annual inflation rates above 100 percent for any year 
between  1970 and 1989. 
71.  See Alesina and others (1992), Barro (1991), Bhalla (1994), and Svensson  (1994). Jeffrey  D.  Sachs  and Andrew  Warner  51 
Table 12.  Effects of Growth on Human and Physical Capital Accumulationa 
Independent  Dependent  variable 
variable  INV7089b  DS  YRc  DPYRd 
Constant  -0.144  0.118  0.151 
(-2.232)  (3.144)  (4.566) 
OPENe  0.054  -0.004  -0.003 
(3.328)  (-0.502)  (-0.360) 
LGDP70f  0.047  -0.010  -0.016 
(6.412)  (-2.137)  (-4.283) 
Summarv statistics 
R~2  0.519  0.069  0.250 
Mean dependent  variable  0.182  0.049  0.025 
SER  0.063  0.033  0.027 
Sample  size  113  97  90 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  based on data described  in the appendix. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are t statistics. 
b.  IN7089  is the ratio of public and private investment  spending to GDP,  averaged over  the period  1970-89. 
c.  DSYR  is  average  accumulation  of  secondary  schooling  over  the  period  1970-85.  Specifically,  DSYR 
[ln(SYR85)  -  ln(SYR70)/15],  where  SYRxx is person years  of secondary  schooling  divided  by the total population 
over age fifteen. 
d.  DPYR is accumulation  of primary schooling,  calculated  in the same manner as DSYR. 
e.  OPEN  is a dummy variable set equal to one for open economies. 
f.  LGDP70  is the natural log of GDP per capita in  1970. 
We have shown above that the labor-to-land ratio has been a determi- 
nant of the timing of liberalization among developing  countries.  In re- 
gression 7 we include this ratio as a possible independent determinant of 
growth, to check whether openness  is acting simply as a proxy for rela- 
tive factor endowments.  The variable is insignificant,  while the open- 
ness variable maintains its magnitude and statistical significance. 
We have found strong evidence  that protectionist  trade policies  re- 
duce overall growth when controlling for the other variables. Since poor 
trade policies  might also affect the rates of investment  relative to GDP 
and the rates of human capital accumulation, we would expect poor poli- 
cies to have indirect adverse growth effects as a result of slower accumu- 
lation of capital, both physical and human. In regressions  8-10 in table 
12, we therefore check whether open and closed economies  differed sys- 
tematically in the rates of capital accumulation,  once we control for ini- 
tial income.  In regression 8 we find that the open economies  had signifi- 
cantly  higher  investment-to-GDP  ratios,  and  that  OPEN  raised  the 
investment ratio by an average of 5.4 percentage points.72  Interestingly, 
72.  Levine  and Renelt (1992), using trade shares as a measure of openness,  also find 
that investment shares are higher in more open economies.  This is one of the few findings 
that they classify as robust, using extreme bounds analysis. 52  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
there is also some evidence that richer countries have higher investment 
rates than poorer countries. 
In regressions  9 and 10, we ask whether the increase  in educational 
attainment between  1970 and 1985 was different for the two subsets  of 
countries.  We find no evidence  that the closed  economies  had less  im- 
provement in the coverage of primary and secondary education than did 
the open economies.  It is clear, though, that the more developed  econo- 
mies had less improvement in educational coverage than did the poorer 
countries (as evidenced by the significant negative sign on initial income 
in both regressions). 
Based on the regression analysis,  we may make four conclusions: 
-There  is  strong evidence  of unconditional  convergence  for open 
countries,  and no  evidence  of  unconditional  convergence  for  closed 
countries  .7 
-Closed  countries  systematically  grow more slowly  than do open 
countries,  showing that "good" policies  matter. 
-The  role of trade policy continues after controlling for other growth 
factors, as in a standard Barro cross-country  growth equation. 
-Poor  trade policies  seem to affect growth directly,  controlling for 
other factors, and to affect the rate of accumulation of physical capital. 
Trade Policy  and Changes  in the Export Structure 
One of the original arguments for SLI was the promotion of manufac- 
turing exports.  Raul Prebisch and other economists  worried that raw 
materials exporters that maintained free trade would be unable to indus- 
trialize, and would therefore be vulnerable to long-term adverse move- 
ments in the terms of trade between  primary and manufactured goods. 
Import substitution,  it was argued, would give time for domestic  indus- 
try to develop  and to improve productivity,  perhaps sufficient to gener- 
ate manufactured exports  in the distant future. Paul Krugman gave an 
influential exposition  of this infant-industry argument in a formal model 
of  increasing-returns-to-scale  production  resulting  from  learning  by 
doing.74 
73.  An alternative, and formally equivalent, way to state our conclusion is that conver- 
gence is conditional on policies,  not on structural variables (for example,  initial income or 
level of education).  We therefore argue against the notion of a low-income  "development 
trap," since open trade policies  (and correlated market policies)  are available to even the 
poorest countries. 
74.  Krugman (1987). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  53 
Using our classification  of trade policy,  we can examine the two re- 
lated propositions that open trade condemns raw materials exporters to 
nonindustrialization,  and that closed  trade promotes  industrial exports 
in the long term. Based on UNCTAD  classifications  of trade structure, 
we measure the share of primary exports  (agriculture, minerals, fuels, 
and  metals)  in  total  merchandise  exports,  X.  We  then  examine  the 
change in X between  1971 and 1989 as a function of trade policy  during 
the period. 
Our basic model is: 
(4)  X,89  -  =  (B  +  yOPEN1)  x  (X/T  -  X71). 
According  to equation 4, the share of primary exports  in GDP adjusts 
gradually to a long-term equilibrium level  denoted XiLT.  This long-term 
level  may itself be a function of the specific factor endowments  of the 
country,  for example  the ratio of labor to  land and other natural re- 
sources,  as well as the long-term  structure of trade policy itself. The de- 
gree of openness,  in turn, may affect the speed of adjustment. If the pa- 
rameter y is positive,  open economies  adjust more rapidly to their long- 
term equilibrium, while if y is negative,  closed  economies  adjust more 
rapidly to their long-term equilibrium, X/LT.  According to the theory of 
import  protection  as  export  promotion,  a  primary  exporter  that  is 
evolving toward being a manufacturing exporter will experience  afaster 
transition to manufacturing exports with a protective  trade policy  (that 
is, y < O). 
We estimate  equation 4, with the addition of a constant  term, 0, in 
four variants. In the first regression  shown in table 13, we assume  that 
the long-term level of X is the same for all economies,  and that the export 
structure gradually adjusts to that common long-run value. Our point es- 
timate of the long-run value of X is not significantly different from zero 
(that is, no exports of primary goods in the long run). We find that closed 
economies  have  a partial adjustment  coefficient  of  only  0.049,  while 
open economies  have a coefficient  of 0.366  (equal to 0.049  +  0.317). 
Thus open economies  tend to adjust more rapidly from being primary- 
intensive to manufactures-intensive  exporters.  The difference in speed 
of adjustment is statistically  significant. While many countries adopted 
the model of import protection as export promotion (of manufactures), 
it was the open economies  that did best in promoting the export of manu- 
factures. 54  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
Table 13.  Openness and Export Diversity in Developing Countriesa 
Estimated  Regression 
parameter  1  2  3  4 
0  -  0.035  -0.044  -  0.044  -0.044 
(-0.377)  (-0.397)  (-0.397)  (-0.902) 
13  0.049  0.034  0.034  0.036 
(0.491)  (0.315)  (0.315)  (0.413) 
y  0.317  0.286  0.286  0.318 
(1.987)  (1.408)  (1.408)  (2.535) 
cx  -  0.035  0.055  0.055  0.078 
(-0.097)  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.035) 
8  -  0.077  -  0.077  -  0.0013 
(-0.339)  (-0.339)  (-0.058) 
E  -  0.000004  -0.272 
(-0.000)  (-0.123) 
Summary statistics 
R2  0.165  0.162  0.162  0.129 
Mean dependent  variable  -  0.101  -  0.103  -0.103  -0.094 
SER  0.160  0.161  0.161  0.151 
Sample  size  80  78  78  99 
Source:  Authors'  regression  based on data described  in the appendix. 
a.  The  regressions  are from equation 4 in the text,  X89 -  X71 =  6  +  (p +  y OPEN)  (oe +  8 POPL  +  e OPEN 
-  X71). OPEN  is a dummy  variable set  equal to one for open  economies.  POPL  is the ratio of population  to land 
area  in  1960. X71 and X89 are the  fraction  of  primary exports  in total  exports  in  1971 and  1989. The  numbers  in 
parentheses  are t statistics. 
The next two variants of the regression investigate whether the land- 
to-labor ratio and the trade policy affect the long-term levels of X. In the 
second regression, we assume that X is a negative function of the endow- 
ment of population (POP) relative to land area (L). Economies  with a 
high population-to-land area ratio would be expected to have a low value 
of X, so if XiT  =  at +  i(POPIL)i,  we expect  8 < 0. In the third equation 
in table  13 we assume that the measure of trade policy  during 1970-90 
(OPEN  =  0 or 1) is also a measure of long-run trade policy (or the mar- 
ket's  expectation  of long-run trade policy),  and is therefore a determi- 
nant of the long-run value of X, so that X/T  =  ot  +  bi(POPIL1)  +  EOPENi. 
As table  13 shows,  neither the ratio of population  to land area nor 
openness is a statistically significant determinant of the long-run propor- 
tion of primary exports. In fact, the estimated XLT is virtually unaffected 
by the inclusion of the other variables. The important result is that the 
speed of adjustment is still different in closed and open economies.  Open 
economies  continue to display much greater dynamism in changing their 
export  structure from primary commodities  to manufactures.  Indeed, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  55 
closed economies  display almost no change at all in export structure dur- 
ing the nearly-twenty-year  interval examined  in the regressions,  since 
the estimate  of ,3 is always  insignificant. In regression  4 we  show that 
these  conclusions  also hold when the regression  is estimated  with the 
developed  countries added to the sample. 
Trade Policy  and Macroeconomic  Crises 
Jeffrey Sachs argued in 1985 that the outward orientation of the East 
Asian economies  had saved them from the developing  country debt cri- 
sis that ravaged Latin America.75 Now,  ten years later, it is possible  to 
reassess  his hypothesis  with a greater time span and a larger number of 
country observations.  Is there evidence  that openness to trade helped to 
avoid macroeconomic  crises in the 1980s? To address this issue we clas- 
sify countries according to their trade orientation in the 1970s and then 
examine  whether the countries  that were  open  in the  1970s were  less 
likely  to  experience  a severe  macroeconomic  crisis  in the  1980s and 
1990s. For these purposes,  we define a severe macroeconomic  crisis by 
any one of the following three occurrences: 
-A  rescheduling of foreign debt in the Paris Club (official creditors) 
or the London Club (commercial bank creditors). 
-Arrears  on  external  payments  (including  debt  servicing),  as  re- 
ported by the IMF. 
-An  inflation rate in excess  of 100 percent per year. 
We expect that closed economies  will be more likely than open econ- 
omies to fall into one or more of these crises, for several related reasons. 
First,  and most  important, closed  economies  often  borrowed  heavily 
from foreign sources in order to overcome  economic  stagnation caused 
by the deeper problem of poor economic policies.76 The reliance on debt 
was a temporary expedient,  and resulted in a debt crisis when creditors 
withdrew support from further lending. Second,  closed  economies  ori- 
ented investment  toward nontraded goods,  and thus lacked the foreign 
exchange earnings to service the debts. Third, closed economies  tended 
to have a higher level of state involvement  in the economy,  including the 
ownership of state enterprises. Loss-making state enterprises added sig- 
nificantly to the overall fiscal burden of many governments in the 1980s, 
contributing to the onset of high inflation and foreign debt crises. 
75.  Sachs (1985). 
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Table 14.  Developing Country Openness and Macroeconomic Crisisa 
Macroeconomic  No  macroeconomic 
Openness  crisis in 1980s  crisis  in 1980s 
Open in 1970s  1  16 
Not open in 1970s  (i)  59  14 
Source:  See  appendix. 
a.  In a test of independence  the chi square is 34.8 (significance  level  <0.000). 
There are seventeen  developing countries that had an open trade pol- 
icy in the 1970s. Of these,  only Jordan succumbed to a macroeconomic 
crisis after opening: debt reschedulings  in 1987 and 1992, and external 
payments arrears in 1993. The first episode  of macroeconomic  difficul- 
ties followed a sharp cutback in foreign aid from the oil-rich states of the 
region as a result of the collapse  of world oil prices in 1986. Following 
the 1990 Gulf War, Jordan experienced  a more serious macroeconomic 
shock, which cost it heavily in remittance and export earnings. 
There were  seventy-three  closed  developing  countries  in the  1970s. 
Of these, as many as fifty-nine experienced a severe macroeconomic  cri- 
sis: forty-nine had a debt crisis; fifty had external payments arrears; and 
nineteen  had inflation above  100 percent  (most manifested  more than 
one of these  crises).  Table  14 summarizes  the relative  frequencies  of 
openness  and macroeconomic  crisis. A x2 test on the null hypothesis  of 
independence between trade policy in the 1970s and macroeconomic  cri- 
sis in the 1980s is rejected at the 0.000 level. 
Rather than focus on the large majority of countries that succumbed 
to crisis, it is easier to assess the fourteen that did not: Bangladesh, Bots- 
wana, Burundi, China, Colombia,  Hungary, India, Iran, Nepal,  Papua 
New  Guinea,  Rwanda,  Sri Lanka,  Tunisia,  and Zimbabwe.  Of these, 
Botswana had opened its economy  by 1979; Colombia maintained very 
cautious and moderate policies  both in trade and in finance; both Hun- 
gary and India,  in fact,  flirted with a debt crisis  which  was  narrowly 
averted; China began the 1980s with very little debt because  it had bor- 
rowed little during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76; Bangladesh,  Bu- 
rundi, Nepal,  and Rwanda are among the world's poorest countries and 
have little, if any, access  to loans on commercial terms, which has prob- 
ably saved them from generating a debt crisis.  Moreover,  Burundi and 
Rwanda have been subject to extreme internal unrest. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  57 
Recent Reforms and Economic Performance 
The previous section compared countries with long-standing policies 
of open trade during the nineteen-year  period  1970-89,  with countries 
that were closed during some or all of the period. In this section,  we ex- 
amine the growth effects  of trade liberalization in developing  countries 
that have opened their economies  since  1975. By our assessment,  there 
are thirty-eight non-communist reformers that have opened their econo- 
mies  since  1975 and sustained  the  opening  until  1993. Venezuela  at- 
tempted trade liberalization between  1989 and 1992, but the policy was 
then reversed.  Another thirty-six countries  in our sample did not even 
achieve  a temporary liberalization  during 1980-93.  In addition to this 
group of countries,  we also examine the recent growth performance of 
the twenty-five  post-communist  economies  of eastern  Europe and the 
former Soviet  Union,  to see  how growth performance relates to trade 
reform and overall economic  reform. 
Here, we stress again that trade reform is almost always accompanied 
by a much broader range of reforms, including macroeconomic  stabili- 
zation,  internal liberalization (for example,  the end of price controls), 
legal reform, and often extensive  privatization. This has been especially 
clear in the post-communist  countries.  In almost all cases,  trade reform 
has  been  part of  the  overall  institutional  harmonization  with  the ad- 
vanced  market economies.  Our results  cannot,  therefore,  distinguish 
between  the effects  of trade policy per se, and the effects  of other parts 
of the policy  package  that accompany  the trade measures.  While we 
view  the direct effects  of trade liberalization  (increased  competition, 
specialization,  and reduced rent-seeking) as important contributory fac- 
tors for growth, we put off attempting to tease out the specific contribu- 
tions to growth of the various parts of a standard reform program until a 
future study. 
We note also that the very-short-term growth consequences  of a trade 
reform will depend importantly on the inherited structure of the econ- 
omy. In the post-communist  countries of eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, the long period of central planning left the economy  with 
an enormously  overgrown  heavy  industrial sector,  evident,  for exam- 
ple, in the high levels  of coal and steel production relative to the rest of 58  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
output. In those economies,  therefore, the end of central planning (and 
the sharp drop in armaments production in the former Soviet Union) re- 
sulted initially in a significant drop of industrial output. This was true 
throughout the region,  independent  of the  specific  nature of a reform 
program. In the East Asian communist economies,  by contrast, the in- 
dustrial sector was much smaller at the start of reforms, so they did not 
experience  a drop in industrial production when trade and other market 
reforms were first introduced.77 
Table 15 examines the economic growth of recent developing country 
reformers by comparing the annual growth for country i in four inter- 
vals: I,  =  [T -  10, T -  4], I2  =  [T -  3, T -  1], I3  =  [T, T +  2], and 
I4  =  [T +  3, N],  where N is either [T +  10] or the latest year for which 
data are available (usually  1993), whichever  is earlier.  T is the year of 
trade liberalization,  that is, the year in which trade policy first satisfies 
the five criteria for openness described above.  By estimating the follow- 
ing regression model, we test whether growth is higher or lower on aver- 
age after the onset of open trade: 
(5)  Git =  Oti +  Y2D2t  +  Y3D3t  +  Y4D4t  +  ,it 
where Djt =  1 for t belonging to Ij and Djt =  0 otherwise.  This equation 
allows for a separate fixed effect on growth for country i, plus a timing 
effect for intervals 2, 3, and 4. The error term,  Eit,  is an (i.i.d.)  random 
variable.  If trade liberalization  raises  growth  relative  to  the  "distant 
past" (years [T -  10] through [T -  4]), then Y3  and y4 should be positive. 
If trade liberalization raises growth relative to the "recent past" (years 
[T -  3] through [T -  1]), then (Y3 -  Y2) and (Y4 -  Y2) will be positive.  If 
trade reform is initially contractionary, and subsequently expansionary, 
we would find Y3  < 0 and y4 >  O. 
The estimated coefficients are as follows,  with t statistics in parenthe- 
ses below: 
(6)  Git =  i-  (0.88)D2t +  (1.09)D3t +  (1.33)D4t)+  Eit. 
(-  1.66)  (1.98)  (2.25) 
According to these results, economic  growth is indeed higher after trade 
liberalization than in the distant past,  both in the near term [T,T +  2], 
77.  See Sachs and Woo (1993) and Sachs (1995c) for comparisons  of eastern Europe 
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Table 15.  Real Per Capita Growth Rates of the Recent Reformersa 
Annual averages  over  subperiods  (percent) 
Reform 
Countmy  year  tE [-10,  -4]  tE[-3,  -1]  tE[O,  2]  tE[3,  n] 
Argentina  1991  -0.10  -  3.83  6.55 
Benin  1990  0.25  -  3.25  0.91  0.38 
Bolivia  1985  -  1.78  -  5.06  -  2.88  1.14 
Botswana  1979  13.96  9.87  7.31  5.31 
Brazil  1991  4.08  -  2.32  -  0.08 
Cameroon  1993  -  3.47  -  9.17  -  7.68 
Chile  1976  1.20  -6.21  4.98  3.44 
Colombia  1991  2.54  2.03  1.91 
Costa Rica  1986  -3.80  0.87  1.64  2.45 
Ecuador  1991  -  1.36  2.05  1.34 
El Salvador  1989  -0.93  0.29  0.60  2.83 
Gambia  1985  -0.61  -0.14  -1.37  -0.12 
Ghana  1985  -  0.55  -  3.93  1.31  1.37 
Guatemala  1988  -3.97  -  1.83  0.69  1.21 
Guinea  1986  1.40  0.58 
Guinea-Bissau  1987  -  1.87  1.15  3.63  0.74 
Guyana  1988  -  5.40  -  0.69  -4.50  6.89 
Honduras  1991  0.43  -0.08  1.15 
India  1994  2.97  4.90  1.00 
Israel  1985  3.41  0.38  3.43  1.41 
Jamaica  1988  -0.10  0.25  3.22  0.27 
Kenya  1993  2.66  -  1.20  -  1.66 
Mali  1988  -  2.15  3.21  0.74  0.03 
Mexico  1986  3.93  -  1.34  -  1.98  1.03 
Morocco  1984  3.01  -  0.46  3.23  -0.00 
Nepal  1991  3.35  3.94  0.62 
Nicaragua  1991  -  4.45  -  6.25  -  2.84 
Paraguay  1991  -  0.27  2.13  -  0.21 
Peru  1991  4.09  -  9.68  0.35 
Philippines  1988  -2.09  -2.23  2.81  -  1.80 
South Africa  1991  -  1.05  -  0.39  -  2.73 
Sri Lanka  1991  2.31  2.41  3.90 
Tunisia  1989  1.28  -0.45  2.95  3.02 
Turkey  1989  -  0.71  4.16  1.67  3.57 
Uganda  1988  -  6.58  0.25  3.00  0.96 
Uruguay  1990  -0.96  2.56  3.19  0.57 
Zambia  1993  -  1.12  -3.90  3.65 
Summary statistics 
Unweighted  average  0.130  -0.718  1.297  1.965 
Standard deviation  (5.604)  (5.347)  (3.417)  (3.526) 
Source:  These  growth  rates  are  based  on  real GDP  and  population  data  from  the  World Bank  (1994d).  When 
possible,  these data are supplemented  with data from national sources. 
a.  The sample of thirty-seven  countries  corresponds  to the thirty-six countries  that opened  after 1975, from table 
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by  an average  of  1.09 percentage  points  per  year,  and  in the  more 
distant future [T +  3, N],  by an average of 1.33 percentage  points per 
year.78 The near-term gain is significant at (p  =  0.10),  while the long- 
term  gain  is  statistically  significant  at  (p  =  0.05).  The  increase  in 
average  growth is larger when  compared  with the years  immediately 
preceding the trade liberalization,  since average growth rates are lower 
in those  years  than in the  years  [T  -  10] through  [T  -  3] (by 0.88 
percent per year on average).79 
Trade Liberalization  and Growth in Transition Economies 
The countries of central and eastern Europe have been undertaking 
market reforms,  including  trade liberalization,  since  1990, while  the 
countries of the former Soviet Union have been undertaking market re- 
forms since  1992. It is obviously  extremely  premature to draw strong 
conclusions  regarding the effects  of these reforms on the restoration of 
economic  growth. Nonetheless,  at least some evidence  can be adduced 
from the five or more years of reform experienced  by some parts of the 
region. 
78.  Other statistics  for the regression  are the number of observations,  N  =  548, ad- 
justed R2 =  0.149; and the F statistic for the overall regression, F  =  3.45 (p < 0.001). The 
only country dummy that is statistically significant is Botswana,  with a dummy variable of 
8.14, t = 4.585. 
79.  It is worthwhile  responding  to two  possible  criticisms  of these  results.  First,  it 
could be objected that if growth outcomes  were purely random, and countries reformed 
only when growth fell below a critical threshold, then although we would tend to observe 
higher growth after reform, it would be incorrect to attribute the higher growth to the re- 
form. However,  we stress that we are comparing growth after the reforms with growth in 
the distant rather than the immediate past, and further, that our period for the distant past 
spans seven years. 
Second,  it is possible that countries may have sorted themselves  randomly as reform- 
ers and nonreformers. If some grew and others did not, and those that did not closed  up 
again and thus were eliminated from our group of reformers, we would be left with a biased 
sample of reformers with high growth. But we have found few examples  of countries that 
experienced  slow growth after true reform. For example, economies  that were temporarily 
open in the  1950s and 1960s and subsequently  closed  again, tended to have high growth 
rates during the liberal episode.  We have also found that certain countries that are some- 
times cited as recent reformers,  such as the Dominican  Republic in the early  1980s and 
Nigeria between  1986 and 1992, actually did not reform sufficiently (by our criteria), while 
others that did reform temporarily, such as Venezuela,  experienced  rapid growth during 
the episode of liberalization. Hence we find few examples to suggest that sample selection 
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We are aided  in this process by a recent review of the reform  experi- 
ence conducted  by the European  Bank  for Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment  (EBRD).80  The EBRD  ranked  each country  of the region  according 
to the extent of trade liberalization,  as well as several other key cate- 
gories of reform,  such as privatization,  regulatory  reform,  and  fiscal re- 
form. Using these indicators,  it is possible to group  the countries  by the 
intensity  of reform  as well as the timing  of its onset, as we do in table 16. 
The intensity  of reform  is measured  on a scale from 1 to 4, with a higher 
number  greater  intensity.  On  the basis of this categorization,  we ask two 
questions:  first,  whether  intensive  reformers  exhibit  more  or  less decline 
in cumulative  GDP  between 1989  and 1994;  and second, whether  inten- 
sive or early reformers  enjoy a faster turnaround  in economic growth, 
and  thereby  achieve positive GDP  growth  by 1994. 
Table 16 shows that all of the strong trade reformers  had achieved 
positive  economic  growth  by 1994,  while none  of the other  countries  had 
done so. On average, the strong  reformers  also experienced  a smaller 
cumulative  loss of GDP  between 1989  and 1994,  though  there is consid- 
erable  variance  in the data. We must stress, however, that since all the 
countries  of central  and eastern  Europe  and the Baltic states are classi- 
fied  as strong  trade  reformers,  while none of the states of the former  So- 
viet Union is, we cannot distinguish  adequately  between the specific 
role of trade  policy and  the many  other  differences  (geography,  politics, 
resource endowments)  between the two regions that might  help to ex- 
plain  the differences  in growth  performance.  At the least we can high- 
light that the data are consistent  with the notion that strong trade re- 
forms have produced a faster turnaround  in growth and a smaller 
cumulative  decline. More  powerful  tests of this hypothesis will have to 
wait until  more  time has elapsed. 
Conclusions 
The world economy at the end of the twentieth  century looks much 
like the world economy at the end of the nineteenth  century. A global 
capitalist  system is taking  shape, drawing  almost  all regions  of the world 
into arrangements  of open trade  and  harmonized  economic institutions. 
As in the nineteenth  century, this new round  of globalization  promises 
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Table 16.  Growth Rates of the Transition Economies 
Percent 
Strength  of  Year of  Cumulative 
trade  trade  growth  Growth 
Countiy  reform  reform  1989-94  1994 
Strong  reforms 
Hungary  4  1990  -  17.94  2.00 
Poland  4  1990  -  9.23  5.00 
Bulgaria  4  1991  -  26.41  1.40 
Czech  Republic  4  1991  -  15.49  3.00 
Slovak  Republic  4  1991  -  19.53  5.00 
Slovenia  4  1991  -  13.26  5.00 
Albania  4  1992  -  22.89  7.00 
Estonia  4  1992  -  29.15  5.00 
Romania  4  1992  -  30.79  3.00 
Croatia  4  1993  -  31.04  1.00 
Latvia  4  1993  -  39.52  3.00 
Lithuania  4  1993  -  55.44  2.00 
Average  -  25.89  3.53 
Moderate  reforms 
Kyrgyzstan  3  1994  -42.30  -  10.00 
Russia  3  closed  -47.29  -  15.00 
Average  -42.61  -  12.50 
Weak reforms 
FYR Macedonia  2  1994  -51.30  -7.00 
Moldova  2  1994  -  54.30  -  25.00 
Armenia  2  closed  -  61.60  0.00 
Kazakhstan  2  closed  -  51.01  -  25.00 
Uzbekistan  2  closed  -  11.75  -  3.00 
Average  -45.99  -  12.00 
Weakest  reforms 
Belarus  1  1994  -  35.93  -  22.00 
Azerbaijan  1  closed  -  54.32  -  22.00 
Georgia  1  closed  -  85.35  -  35.00 
Tajikistan  1  closed  -  70.37  -  25.00 
Turkmenistan  1  closed  -  38.29  -  20.00 
Ukraine  1  closed  -  51.36  -  23.00 
Average  -  55.94  -  24.50 
Overall average  -  38.63  -  7.58 
Source:  European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (1994,  1995) with national sources  for Bulgaria for 
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to lead to economic  convergence  for the countries that join the system. 
In this paper we have provided strong evidence  of convergence  among 
open economies  during the period 1970-89, as well as evidence  of accel- 
erated growth in the countries that have recently undertaken market re- 
forms. 
Our analysis  is necessarily  impressionistic  and imprecise  at several 
crucial points.  We have used trade policy  as our measure of economic 
management, but we are strongly aware that trade policy represents just 
one element-albeit  the most important-of  an overall economic policy. 
Among  developing  countries,  open  trade has tended  to be correlated 
with other features of a healthy economy,  such as macroeconomic  bal- 
ance and reliance on the private sector as the main engine of growth. To 
some extent, opening the economy  has helped to promote governmental 
responsibility  in other  areas.  To  that extent,  trade policy  should  be 
viewed  as the primary instrument of reform. But to some  degree,  our 
measure of trade policy  serves  as a proxy for an entire array of policy 
actions.  Only further cross-country  analysis,  with a more detailed char- 
acterization of the entire policy regime, would allow us to distinguish the 
growth effects of the various components  of economic  policy. 
It is tempting, at the end of the twentieth century, to believe  that the 
birth of a global capitalist economy  is inevitable.  Some have proclaimed 
the "end of history" following the collapse of communism.  Similarly, in 
1910, Norman Angell declared that European wars had come to an end 
because  war was simply too costly  for any rational European govern- 
ment.  But  our  historical  review  should  give  us  profound  pause  for 
thought. Yes, the late twentieth century has certain key advantages over 
1910 for the preservation  of emerging market institutions.  There is the 
spread of sovereignty,  so that imperial adventures  no longer seem  to 
threaten the global peace.  There is the spread of an international rule of 
law, largely through institutions such as the World Trade Organization 
and the International Monetary Fund. There is the spread of democracy, 
which covered some 108 countries in 1994, according to the estimates of 
Freedom House. 
And yet there are also profound risks for the consolidation  of market 
reforms in Russia,  China, and Africa, as well as for the maintenance of 
international agreements  among the leading countries.  The consolida- 
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leadership of the leading democracies.8' The spread of capitalism in the 
twenty-five  years  since  the start of the Brookings  Panel is an historic 
event  of great promise  and significance,  but whether  we  will be cele- 
brating the consolidation  of a democratic and market-based world sys- 
tem at its fiftieth anniversary will depend on our own foresight and good 
judgments in the coming years. 
APPENDIX 
Data 
THE  DATA  SET in this paper begins with the sample of 135 countries in- 
cluded  in version  5.5  of  the  data described  in Summers  and Heston 
(1991). For most of these countries, the growth variable (G7089)  is calcu- 
lated directly from the Summers and Heston data. For seven countries, 
Comoros,  Ethiopia,  Liberia,  Tanzania,  Nicaragua,  Iraq, and Nepal, 
G7089  is calculated using 1970 and 1985 data on real GDP, rather than 
1970 and 1989 data. Swaziland's  G7089  is calculated using real per capita 
GDP data from the World Bank for the years  1972 and 1989. With the 
single  exception  of  Swaziland,  G7089  is measured  as average  annual 
growth in per capita real GDP,  and is expressed  in a common  set of 
prices  (1985 international  prices,  in the  Summers  and Heston  termi- 
nology). 
Out of the Summers-Heston  universe  of 135 countries,  there are 13 
countries that do not have adequate growth data, either because they are 
not available at all, or because  they are not available for a sufficiently 
long time span. At the time of writing, these countries are Afghanistan, 
Bahamas,  Bahrain, Dominica,  Grenada, Kuwait,  Oman, St. Lucia,  St. 
Vincent, Solomon Islands, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and United Arab Emir- 
ates. After excluding these countries,  the sample size falls to 122. 
81.  See Sachs (1995a) for a discussion  of some of the issues facing the advanced coun- 
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Variables Used to Classify Countries as Open or Closed 
The following are the variables used to classify  countries as open or 
not open for the period 1970-89, and their sources: 
BMP70 and BMP80  Black  market exchange  rate premium, averaged 
over  the  1970s and  1980s respectively.  Source: 
Cowitt (1986) with updates from World Bank data 
(supplied by Ross Levine). 
BMP  Dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  either 
BMP70  >  0.2, orBMP80  >  0.2. 
EXM  Dummy  variable  equal  to  1 if a country  had a 
score  of 4 on the export  marketing index  in the 
World Bank study, Adjustment in Africa (Husain 
and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238). A  score  of 4 means 
that the country had extreme distortions resulting 
from  its  export  marketing board.  These  boards 
are state-run monopsonies  that typically purchase 
agricultural products at prices much below world 
prices,  and then resell them at world prices.  The 
study covered African countries only. 
Soc  Dummy  variable  equal  to  1 if the  country  was 
classified as socialist in Kornai (1992, table 1.1). 
O WQI  Variable indicating coverage of quotas on imports 
of intermediates and capital goods.  It is the own- 
import  weighted  nontariff frequency  on  capital 
goods and intermediates.  Includes licensing,  pro- 
hibitions,  and quotas.  It is taken from Barro and 
Lee (1994) who,  in turn, rely on UNCTAD  data. 
The period covered is 1985-88. 
OWQID  Dummy variable equal to 1 if OWQI >  0.4. 
OWTI  Variable indicating average tariffs on imports of 
intermediates and capital goods.  It is the own-im- 
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and intermediates.  It is taken from Barro and Lee 
(1994) who,  in turn, rely on UNCTAD  data. Pe- 
riod covered is 1985-88. 
OPEN  Dummy variable equal to 1 for open economies.  It 
is equal to 0 if a country scored a 1 on either the 
BMP variable, the SOC variable, the EXM vari- 
able,  or the  OWQID variable.  If a country  had 
some  missing  values  and was  not otherwise  ex- 
cluded,  some  effort  was  made  to  classify  it  as 
either a 0 or a 1, as is discussed  below.  The tariff 
variable is not used in forming the OPEN variable 
because  it  is  redundant:  all  countries  with 
OWTI >  0.4  are already  classified  as  closed  on 
other grounds.  If there were  insufficient  data to 
make  a judgment,  the  country  was  assigned  a 
''missing" value. 
The reasoning behind the adjustments we made to the OPEN variable 
is as follows.  First, we know that we lack cross-country  tariff and quota 
coverage  data for the  1970s, so we  were  especially  concerned  to find 
countries  that had restrictive  trade practices  in the  1970s, but had re- 
formed by the mid-1980s,  and thus appeared open  by the  OWQI and 
OWTI variable. We found one case,  Morocco,  and changed the OPEN 
variable to 0. Other adjustments were made for different reasons.  South 
Africa followed an inward-looking development  strategy throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, and this was reinforced from outside as the rest of the 
world  gradually  tightened  trade  sanctions  on  South  Africa  in  1985. 
(Source: Lachman and Bercuson,  1992.) Hence,  South Africa is rated as 
a closed economy.  Lesotho  and Swaziland were members of the South- 
ern African Customs Union and thus were open in relation to the south- 
ern African region but closed  in relation to the rest of the world. Since 
these economies  are small relative to the South African market, we con- 
sider them inherently ambiguous cases  and assign them "missing" val- 
ues (Lesotho  is a high-growth economy  and Swaziland is a low-growth 
economy).  Botswana is also a member of the customs union but is rated 
closed,  based on a high black market exchange  rate premium. Haiti was 
rated as closed,  based  on the extensive  evidence  for restrictive  trade 
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is rated as open. New Zealand is rated as closed,  based on evidence  that 
quantitative trade restrictions covered  more than 40 percent of imports 
in 1981 and 1983. (Source: Laird and Yeats,  1990, table 4.2.) Australia is 
rated as open, based on Caves and Krause (1984). 
After  these  adjustments,  there  remained  nine  small  countries  for 
which we had insufficient data to make an informed assessment  on the 
OPEN  variable: Cape Verde,  Comoros,  Liberia,  Iceland,  Fiji, Malta, 
Panama, Seychelles,  and Suriname. Therefore,  whenever  the analysis 
in the paper requires the OPEN variable, the sample size is reduced to 
111. 
The following variables are used to define the POL dummy variable. 
RIGHT  Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country scored a 6 
or above (higher means more repressive) on either 
the political rights index or the civil liberties index 
in MacMillan,  Rausser,  and Johnson  (1994,  ta- 
ble 1, pp. 8-10). 
EDU  Dummy variable equal to 1 in cases  of extremely 
disruptive unrest. Intended to capture disruptive 
internal or external wars, coups, and revolutions. 
Constructed by the authors using several indica- 
tors.  First,  countries  were  assigned  a  I  if they 
scored 0.6 or higher on the REVC70 or REVC80 
index in Barro and Lee (1994). In addition, the fol- 
lowing  countries  were  assigned  a  1 because  of 
conflicts:  Angola  (sixteen-year  civil  war);  Bu- 
rundi (Hutu rebellion 1973-74, resulting in an esti- 
mated  160,000  deaths);  Chad  (repeated  battles 
with  Moslem  rebels  in the  north);  El  Salvador 
(twelve-year  civil  war); Ethiopia  (extended  war 
with Somalia over control of the Ogaden region of 
Ethiopia); Guatemala (repeated conflicts between 
the military rulers and the guerrilla army of the 
poor); Iran and Iraq (war in the early  1980s); Is- 
rael;  Mozambique  (protracted  civil  war  in  the 
1980s); Nicaragua (civil war); Panama (U.S.  inva- 
sion in the late 1980s); Somalia (see Ethiopia); Sri 
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halese  separatists);  Uganda (invasion  by Tanza- 
nia); Zimbabwe (revolt against government of Ian 
Smith in the late 1970s). 
For the RIGHT variable, Hungary and Yugoslavia  were assigned a 1 
and Cote d'Ivoire and Hong Kong were assigned a 0. The list of coun- 
tries and their scores on these variables are listed in table Al. 
The other variables used in this paper, along with sources,  are as fol- 
lows. The organization is by table. 
Variables Used in Tables 
Tables 1-5 
EPA  External payments arrears, as rated by the IMF's 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. 
DC  Country  had  a  multilateral  debt  rescheduling, 
based  on  data in the  World Debt  Tables of  the 
World Bank. 
HI  Country had inflation above  100 percent,  as re- 
corded  in the  International  Financial  Statistics 
Yearbook, 1994, p. 64. 
The sources for the dating are described in detail below for each coun- 
try. Data for table 5 are from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development's  Transition Report (1994). 
Table 8 
POP601LAND  Population in 1960 (in thousands) divided by land 
area (in square meters). 
POP60  Population in 1960. 
CW  Dummy indicating British Commonwealth status, 
from Famighetti (1993). 
OLDS  Dummy indicating old state,  set to  1.0 for coun- 
tries  that  achieved  independence  before  World 
War II. Table Al.  Variables Used to Construct the POL Variablea 
Repression  Extremely 
Country  of  rightsb  Socialistc  disruptive unrestd 
Algeria  1  0  0 
Angola  1  1  1 
Argentina  0  0  1 
Bangladesh  0  0  1 
Benin  1  1  0 
Bolivia  0  0  1 
Burkina Faso  0  0  1 
Burundi  1  0  1 
Cameroon  1  0  0 
Cape Verde  1  0  0 
Central African Republic  1  0  1 
Chad  1  0  1 
China  1  1  0 
Congo  1  1  0 
Ecuador  0  0  1 
El Salvador  0  0  1 
Ethiopia  1  1  1 
Gabon  1  0  0 
Ghana  0  0  1 
Guatemala  0  0  1 
Guinea  1  0  0 
Guinea-Bissau  1  0  1 
Haiti  1  0  0 
Hungary  1  1  0 
Iran  0  0  1 
Iraq  1  0  1 
Israel  0  0  1 
Liberia  0  0  1 
Malawi  1  0  0 
Mali  1  0  0 
Mauritania  1  0  0 
Mozambique  1  1  1 
Myanmar  1  0  0 
Nicaragua  0  1  1 
Niger  1  0  0 
Panama  0  0  1 
Philippines  0  0  1 
Poland  1  1  0 
Rwanda  1  0  0 
Somalia  1  1  1 
Sri Lanka  0  0  1 
Syrian Arab Republic  1  0  0 
Tanzania  1  0  0 
Thailand  0  0  1 
Togo  1  0  0 
Uganda  0  0  1 
Yugoslavia  1  1  0 
Zaire  1  0  0 
Zimbabwe  0  1  1 
Source: See appendix for complete  definitions of variables and sources. 
a.  I indicates yes. 
b.  The dummy variable RIGHT. 
c.  The dummy variable SOC. 
d.  The dummy variable EDU. 
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TL  The  dependent  variable  is  a dummy  taking the 
value  1.0 if the country had opened  by  1970 and 
stayed open. 
Table 11 
GDP70  Real GDP per capita in 1970 (1985 international 
prices) from Summers and Heston version 5.5. 
GDP89  Real GDP per capita in 1989 (1985 international 
prices) from Summers and Heston version 5.5. 
G7089  Real  per  capita  growth  rate  of  GDP  per  year: 
G7089 =  [ln(GDP89)  -  ln(GDP70)]/19. Note that 
this  variable  is  calculated  differently  for  a few 
countries,  as  listed  at the  beginning  of  this  ap- 
pendix. 
SEC70  Secondary  school enrollment rate. Source: Barro 
and Lee (1994). 
PRI70  Primary school  enrollment  rate.  Source:  Barro 
and Lee (1994). 
GVXDXE  Ratio of real government  "consumption" spend- 
ing net of spending on the military and education, 
to real GDP.  Source: Barro and Lee (1994) who, 
in turn, used Summers and Heston version 5.5. 
REVCOUP  Number of revolutions  and coups per year, aver- 
aged over the period  1970-85.  Source  Barro and 
Lee,  1994. 
ASSASSP  Number of assassinations  per million population 
per year,  1970-85. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
PPI70DEV  The deviation  of the log of the price level  of in- 
vestment  (PPP investment  divided  by exchange 
rate relative to the United States) from the cross- 
country  sample mean in 1970. Source:  Authors' 
calculation  based  on  the  PISH5  price  data  in 
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INV7089  Ratio of  real gross  domestic  investment  (public 
and private) to real GDP,  averaged over  the pe- 
riod 1970-89. Source: Barro and Lee (1994) who, 
in turn, used Summers and Heston version 5.5. 
Table 12 
DS YR  Average  accumulation  of  secondary  schooling 
over  the period  1970-85.  Specifically,  DSYR  = 
[ln(S YR85) -  ln(S YR70)]115,  where S YRxx  is per- 
son years of secondary  schooling  divided by the 
total population over age fifteen. 
DP YR  Accumulation of primary schooling,  calculated in 
the same manner as DS YR. 
Table 13 
X71  Primary export intensity in 1971. Ratio of primary 
exports to total exports in 1971, with both numer- 
ator and denominator  expressed  in nominal dol- 
lars. Primary exports  are defined as agriculture, 
minerals, fuels,  and metals. These  correspond to 
SITC (revision  1) categories  0,  1, 2, 3, 4, and 68. 
Source:  For  all  countries  except  Taiwan  and 
South Africa,  World Bank,  World Tables,  1994. 
Data for Taiwan were obtained from the Taiwan 
Statistical  Data  Book (Republic of China,  1993). 
Data for South Africa include exports of raw dia- 
monds and gold and were obtained from South Af- 
rica's Bulletin  of Statistics,  December  1972 and 
June 1992. Data for Singapore were estimated  as 
0.01,  based  on  GDP  and labor force  data indi- 
cating that Singapore produces no mining, no pri- 
mary energy,  and only  a very  small amount  of 
agriculture,  forestry,  and fishing products.  The 
data for Bangladesh are for 1972 rather than 1971. 
The data for Cameroon were  set to  1.0; they ex- 
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X89  Primary export intensity in 1989, calculated in the 
same manner as X71. 
Table 14 
The growth data for the recent reformers are real per capita growth 
from the World Tables of the World Bank. We did not use the data pro- 
vided by Summers and Heston because we needed recent growth data. 
Background on Country Classifications 
Algeria  Never open. The black market premium averaged 
350 percent  during 1985-90.  Some  trade liberal- 
ization began in the second stage of its reform pro- 
gram in 1991, but implementation was interrupted 
by political turmoil. Source: World Bank, Trends 
in Developing  Economies,  1994 (TIDE), p. 6. 
Angola  Never  open.  A protracted civil war has plagued 
the country  since  independence.  Source:  TIDE, 
p. 12. 
Argentina  Open since  1991. The average nominal tariff level 
for manufacturing was 141 percent in 1958 (Little, 
Scitovsky,  and Scott,  1970, p.  163). The liberal- 
ization in 1976-80 did not sufficiently  reduce ef- 
fective rates of protection (estimated at 88 percent 
for all of manufacturing in 1980, from Cavallo and 
Cottani,  1991, table 3.19). The dating of the liber- 
alization in 1991 is based on TIDE, p. 17. 
Australia  Open since  1964. Australian tariffs were high by 
OECD standards, but the mean tariff did not ex- 
ceed 40 percent.  Source: Unpublished  data from 
the  World  Bank.  The  date  of  liberalization  is 
based on the evidence  of the gradual relaxation of 
quantitative  restrictions  and import licensing  in 
IMF, Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions, 
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Austria  Open  since  1960, based  on the date of full cur- 
rency convertibility  following  membership in the 
European  Free  Trade  Association.  The  IMF's 
Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Restrictions  pro- 
vides evidence  of the liberal trading environment 
since 1960. 
Bangladesh  Never  open.  A phased import liberalization is in 
progress  but  implementation  is  very  slow. 
Source: TIDE, p. 29. 
Barbados  Open since  independence  (November  30,  1966). 
Barbados qualifies on all the criteria for the period 
1970-89. 
Belgium  Open since  1959. Member of the EEC. The aver- 
age tariff in the Common Market was less than 40 
percent  in  1962. Source:  Balassa  (1965, table  1, 
p. 580). No major increase in protection  1962-93. 
Convertibility established  in 1959. 
Benin  Open since  1990. Not  rated as open before  1990 
because it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board  (Husain  and  Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  By 
1990, Benin's  score was 3, and the discussion  in 
TIDE, p. 45, dates the start of the reform as 1989. 
Bolivia  Open 1956-79,  closed  1979-84,  open since  1985. 
The dating is based on black market premium data 
and information on trade policy in Sachs and Mo- 
rales (1988). 
Botswana  Closed  1966-79, open since  1979. Membership in 
the  Southern  African  Customs  Union  makes  it 
hard to rate its trade policy as open or closed.  It is 
open in relation to the southern African market, 
but since the countries in the customs union adopt 
South Africa's external tariffs, it is closed in rela- 
tion to the rest of the world. In the end, we rated 
Botswana as closed in the 1970s, based on its high 
black market premium data. The date of the open- 
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Brazil  Open since  1991. Brazil is rated as closed  before 
1991, based on the evidence  in Coes (1991). Spe- 
cifically, the average effective  protection rates in 
1967 and 1973 exceed  40 percent (see  table 4.1). 
In addition, the index of trade liberalization (see 
figure 4.1) indicates that 1973 was the most  liberal 
year during the period 1947-82, so we rate this pe- 
riod as insufficiently  liberal by our standards. A 
high black market premium also disqualifies Bra- 
zil in the early 1960s and the period 1975-89. The 
1991 dating is based on the reforms of the Collor 
administration. 
Burkina Faso  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain  and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  The 
state-controlled export monopsony is still in oper- 
ation. There is no evidence  in TIDE of a major re- 
cent reform effort. 
Burundi  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score  of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). There 
is no evidence  in TIDE of a major recent reform 
effort. 
Cameroon  Open since  1993. Not  rated as open before  1990 
because it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain  and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  The 
dating  of  the  recent  reform  is  based  on  TIDE, 
p. 78. 
Canada  Open  since  1952, when  it accepted  article  VIII 
status with the International Monetary Fund. 
Cape Verde  Insufficient evidence  on trade policy. 
Central African  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
Republic  cause  it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). There 
is no evidence  in TIDE of a major recent reform 
effort. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  75 
Chad  Never  open. Chad received a score of 4 on its ex- 
port  marketing  board  and  thus  is  considered 
closed  before  1990. In  1990 this  rating was  re- 
duced  to a 3, so that Chad would  potentially  be 
open from this date.  However,  because  there is 
considerable discussion  of the lack of progress on 
trade reforms in TIDE, p. 93, we do not classify 
Chad as a reformer. 
Chile  Open since  1976. Chile is classified  as closed  in 
the 1950s, based on the accounts  of import prohi- 
bitions, licensing,  and multiple exchange  rates in 
various issues of the IMF's Annual Report on Ex- 
change  Restrictions  covering  the years  1950-61. 
For the 1960s, Chile is not rated as open because 
the mean black market premium was 54 percent. 
The 1976 dating for the liberalization is based on 
Dornbusch  and  Edwards  in  Bosworth,  Dorn- 
busch, and Laban (1994, pp. 84-85); as well as Pa- 
pageorgiou,  Michaely,  and Choksi (1991, vol.  7, 
figure 2.3). 
China  Never  open.  Rated as socialist  in Kornai (1992). 
Trade  policies  have  been  progressively  liberal- 
ized  since  1978, but the trading system  was  still 
rife with quantitative restrictions at least through 
1994. (See text for further discussion.) 
Colombia  Open since 1986. Colombia has had a complicated 
mixture  of  tariffs  and  quantitative  restrictions 
since  1931. Its classification  as closed  is based on 
the fact  that the  index  of  trade liberalization  in 
Garcia Garcia (1991) is fairly constant  between 
1950 and 1983, as well  as evidence  that average 
tariffs exceeded  40 percent in 1962, 1971, and 1973 
(Diaz-Alejandro,  1976, p. 108). The liberalization 
episodes  in 1954, 1966, and 1979 were too short to 
qualify as sustained liberalizations. The dating for 
the opening is based on evidence  in Garay (1991) 
that average tariffs rates fell below  40 percent in 
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Congo  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). There 
was an attempt at liberalization in 1987, but it did 
not go far enough (TIDE, p. 117). The export mar- 
keting board was still rated as a 4 in 1990. 
Costa Rica  Open 1952-61,  closed  1962-85,  open since  1986. 
In the 1950s Costa Rica had no exchange  restric- 
tions on foreign payments and no import licensing 
(IMF, Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions, 
various issues).  Imports could be obtained freely 
at an exchange  rate that was  17 percent more de- 
preciated than the rate at which exports had to be 
surrendered to  the  central  bank.  In  1960 Costa 
Rica joined  the Central American Common Mar- 
ket  (CACM),  so  1961 is  chosen  as  the  date  of 
closure.  The mean common  external tariff in the 
CACM  was  40  percent  in  1966 (Carnoy,  1972, 
p.  14).  Costa  Rica  had  a  mean  black  market 
premium in excess  of  20 percent  in the  period 
1960-64. The mean external tariff was 53 percent 
before  1986 (World Bank,  1992a, p. 86). The dat- 
ing for the reform in the 1980s is based on the de- 
cline  in the black  market premium to  1 percent 
(1985-89) and the 1986 tariff liberalization, which 
reduced  the  mean  tariff  to  26  percent  (World 
Bank,  1992a, p. 86). 
Cote d'Ivoire  Never  open.  Received  a score of 4 on its export 
marketing board,  and thus  is considered  closed 
before  1990 (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). 
In 1990 this rating was reduced to a 3. However, 
there are still extensive  nontariff barriers, sched- 
uled  to  be  phased  out  by  1995. Source:  TIDE, 
p. 125. 
Cyprus  Open since independence.  There are some infant 
industry tariffs but the mean has never exceeded 
20 percent.  Trade liberalization has been helped Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  77 
by  the  European  Community's  Mediterranean 
policy.  Cyprus can export  most products at low 
tariffs to the EEC and reciprocates  with low tar- 
iffs on EEC products.  There are no quantitative 
restrictions.  Source: Wilson (1992). 
Denmark  Open since  1959. Although Denmark was not an 
original  member  of  the  EEC  or  the  EFTA,  its 
trade policy was harmonized with the rest of Eu- 
rope.  Dating is based on timing of convertibility 
throughout Europe. 
Dominican  Never  open.  The  liberalization  episode  of 
Republic  1981-86 did not go far enough. Another liberaliza- 
tion started in 1991, but has not progressed  sig- 
nificantly. Source: TIDE, p. 135. 
Ecuador  Open 1950-82,  closed  1983-90,  open  since  1991. 
The dating of the initial liberal phase is based on 
the IMF's Annual Report  on Exchange  Restric- 
tions  from the early  1950s, which  states that im- 
port licenses  were, "in most cases," issued freely, 
and De Janvry,  Sadoulet,  and Fargeix  (1991, p. 
58), who report implied trade taxes for the period 
1970-85.  Extensive  trade reform was  started in 
1990. By  1991 virtually all the  nontariff restric- 
tions  had been  eliminated.  The  maximum tariff 
was 35 percent in 1990. Source: Economist  Intelli- 
gence Unit, Country Report 3, 1991; and TIDE, p. 
140. 
Egypt  Never  open. The state-led development  planning 
and import-substituting industrialization policies 
were established  in the mid- to late  1950s, under 
Nasser.  We  lack  hard  data  to  gauge  whether 
Egypt  was  open  in the  years  immediately  after 
World War II. Egypt has certainly not been open 
since 1960, the start of the first five-year period for 
which we  have black market premium data. Be- 
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percent. Furthermore, UNCTAD  data in the mid- 
1980s report an average effective  import tariff of 
49 percent (Barro and Lee,  1994). The assessment 
that  Egypt's  recent  reforms  are  insufficient  to 
qualify as open is based on TIDE, p. 145. 
El Salvador  Open  1950-61,  closed  1962-89,  open  since  1989. 
El  Salvador  assumed  the  obligations  of  article 
VIII in 1946. In the 1950s and early 1960s import 
licenses  were not required, and there were few re- 
strictions on payments or transfers abroad (IMF, 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,  various 
issues).  In  1960, El  Salvador joined  the Central 
American  Common Market (CACM),  so  1961 is 
chosen as the date of closure.  The mean common 
external tariff in the CACM was 40 percent in 1966 
(Carnoy,  1972, p.  14). The  mean  external  tariff 
was  53  percent  1966-86  (World  Bank,  1992a, 
p. 86). The 1989 dating is based on TIDE, p. 151. 
Ethiopia  Never  open.  Civil war and devastating  famines 
started  in the  1970s and continued  through the 
mid- 1980s (Famighetti,  1993, p.  762).  A  transi- 
tional government  assumed  power  in May  1991, 
and a fragile truce prevailed in 1992. It is still too 
early to rate this as a reforming economy. 
Finland  Open  since  1960, based  on the date of full cur- 
rency convertibility  following  membership in the 
European  Free  Trade  Association.  The  IMF's 
Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Restrictions  pro- 
vides evidence  of the liberal trading environment 
between  1960 and the present. 
France  Open since  1959, based  on date of full currency 
convertibility.  Member of the EEC. The average 
tariff in the Common Market was less than 40 per- 
cent  in  1962,  Source:  Balassa  (1965,  table  1, 
p. 580). No major increase in protection  1962-93. 
Gabon  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
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board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p. 238). The ex- 
port marketing board is still rated as a 4 in 1990. 
TIDE, p. 177, only mentions a reform program in 
1994. 
Gambia  Reform  1985. Not  rated as open  up to  1985 be- 
cause of a score of 4 on its export marketing board 
(Husain and Faruqee,  1994 p. 238). The Gambia 
receives  a 2 in 1990, and Husain and Farugee re- 
port virtually no administrative  controls  on for- 
eign exchange allocation. The 1985 dating is based 
on the discussion  of extensive  trade liberalization 
efforts in TIDE, p. 181. 
Germany  Open since  1959, based  on date of full currency 
convertibility.  Member of the EEC. The average 
tariff in the Common Market was less than 40 per- 
cent  in  1962. Source:  Balassa  (1965,  table  1, p. 
580). No major increase in protection  1962-93. 
Ghana  Open since  1985. The black market premium fell 
from 1,098 percent (average 1981-86) to 3 percent 
(1990), falling below 20 percent in 1985. In 1990, 0 
percent  of foreign exchange  allocation  was con- 
trolled, and only two items were  subject to non- 
tariff barriers. The World Bank rates it as a 4 on 
the export  marketing board in 1990, but the dis- 
cussion in TIDE, p. 191, has no mention of this as 
a constraint on openness.  Hence we rate Ghana as 
open from 1985. 
Greece  Open since  1959. Tariffs and quotas were already 
low in mid-1950s (Eichengreen,  1994, table  1, p. 
35,  and Kottis,  1989, p.  335) and convertibility 
was  established  in  May  1959  (IMF,  Annual 
Report on Exchange Restrictions,  1960, p. 8). 
Guatemala  Open 1950-61,  closed  1962-88,  open since  1988. 
Guatemala assumed the obligations of article VIII 
in 1947. In the 1950s and early 1960s there was no 
import  licensing  nor  significant  restrictions  on 
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port on Exchange Restrictions,  various  issues). In 
1960,  Guatemala  joined  the  Central  American 
Common Market (CACM),  so  1961 is chosen  as 
the date of closure.  The mean common  external 
tariff in the CACM was 40 percent in 1966 (Car- 
noy,  1972, p. 14). The mean external tariff was 53 
percent  1966-86 (World Bank,  1992a, p. 86). The 
election of a civilian government in 1985 started a 
period  of  reform.  The  1988 dating  is  based  on 
TIDE, p. 196. 
Guinea  Open since  1986. Not  open before  1986 due to a 
rating of 4 on its export marketing board (Husain 
and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  In  1990 the  World 
Bank reports a black market premium of 8 percent 
and gives Guinea a rating of 1 (most liberal) on its 
export  marketing  system.  The  1986  dating  is 
based on TIDE, p. 200, which reports a compre- 
hensive  dismantling of state-led development  in- 
stitutions, including external trade protection. 
Guinea-Bissau  Open since  1987. Not  open before  1987 due to a 
rating of 4 on its export marketing board (Husain 
and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  In  1990 the  World 
Bank reports a black market premium of  -  2 per- 
cent and gives  Guinea a rating of 1 (most liberal) 
on its export marketing system. The 1987 dating is 
based on TIDE, p. 205. 
Guyana  Open since  1988. A high mean black market pre- 
mium (298 percent) disqualifies Guyana between 
about 1975 and the late 1980s. Prior to 1988 there 
was  an extensive  list of import prohibitions  and 
restrictions,  which  have  since  been  greatly  re- 
duced (World Bank,  1993b, p. 32). In 1991 Guy- 
ana adopted  the  Caribbean Community  (CARI- 
COM)  common  external  tariff  schedule,  with 
rates that average well below 40 percent. The 1988 
dating is based on the assessment  in TIDE, p. 210, 
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Haiti  Never open. Extensive  tariffs and quantitative re- 
strictions protected domestic manufacturing from 
1949 through 1986 (Lundhal,  1992, p. 407). There 
are special export zones  in Haiti where firms are 
allowed  to import intermediate products,  assem- 
ble them,  and then export,  but these  represent a 
small fraction of the economy.  Since 1986 liberal- 
ization has been extremely slow. In 1990 the black 
market premium was  still 40 percent  (Lundahl, 
1992, p. 418). 
Honduras  Open 1950-61,  closed  1962-90,  open  since  1991. 
Honduras assumed the obligations of article VIII 
in 1950. In the 1950s and early 1960s there were no 
significant restrictions  on payments  or transfers 
abroad (IMF,  Annual  Report  on Exchange  Re- 
strictions,  various  issues).  In  1960  Honduras 
joined  the  Central  American  Common  Market 
(CACM), so 1961 is chosen as the date of closure. 
The mean commnon  external  tariff in the CACM 
was 40 percent in 1966 (Carnoy, 1972, p. 14). The 
mean  external  tariff  was  53  percent  1966-86 
(World Bank, 1992a, p. 86). An extensive  trade re- 
form between  1990 and 1992 included the elimina- 
tion of import permits and administrative foreign 
exchange  allocation.  Import tariffs were reduced 
to a range of 5-20 percent (TIDE, p. 214). 
Hong Kong  Always open. 
Hungary  Open since  1990. Source: European Bank for Re- 
construction and Development  (1994). 
India  Open since  1994. Rated as closed before 1991 due 
to very high tariffs and elaborate quantitative re- 
strictions  dating from the early  1950s (Bhagwati 
and Desai,  1970). The 1994 dating is based on the 
start  of  a  trade  liberalization  program  (TIDE, 
p. 223), and average tariff data in Krishna and Mi- 
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Indonesia  Open since  1970. Indonesia  had a dual exchange 
rate system that ended April 17, 1970 (Pitt, 1991). 
The important trade liberalization measures were 
introduced between  May 1966 and July 1967. Im- 
port  licensing  was  eliminated  in  October  1966 
(Pitt,  1991, p.  181). The  median  tariff rate  had 
fallen below 40 percent by 1970 (Pitt, 1991, table 
5.10,  p.  90,  which  relies  on  Rosendale,  1981, 
p. 276). 
Iran  Never  open. Iran maintained tight restrictions on 
imports through the annual publication of import 
lists  by the Ministry of National  Economy.  The 
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions 
for 1953 states that the ministry has prohibited a 
"large number  of  goods,"  although  there  is  no 
quantification. The evidence  of numerous admin- 
istrative  controls  on  foreign  trade  provided  by 
Amuzegar  (1977)  leads  us  to  classify  Iran  as 
closed.  Black  market  premium  data  disqualify 
Iran after 1975. 
Iraq  Never open. Black market premium averaged 230 
percent in the 1980s. Import quota system was in 
place  in the  early  1950s.  All  imports  that com- 
peted with Iraqi new industries were on the pro- 
hibited list. 
Ireland  Open since  1966. Dating is based on membership 
in the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area from 1966, and 
data provided  by 0  Grada and O'Rourke  (1994, 
pp. 17, 29). 
Israel  Open  since  1985. Israel initially pursued an im- 
port-substituting  industrialization  policy  in  the 
1950s. Since then, there has been gradual liberal- 
ization,  so the question  is when  Israel first quali- 
fies as open.  An import liberalization took place 
between  1962 and 1965, but Pack (1971, table 4.6) 
reports rates of nominal protection by sector that Jeffrey  D. Sachs and  Andrew  Warner  83 
clearly average above 40 percent in 1965. In addi- 
tion, the mean black market premium was 25 per- 
cent  in the  1970s,  so  Israel does  not qualify as 
open during that decade.  In 1975 Israel became an 
associate  member of the European  Community; 
at the  same  time,  many  countries  followed  the 
lead of the Arab countries in boycotting trade with 
Israel. The dating of 1985 is based on the signing 
of a free trade agreement with the United  States 
and  successful  inflation  stabilization.  Sources: 
Razin  and  Sadka  (1993) and  Halevi  and  Baruh 
(1991). 
Italy  Open since  1959, based  on date of full currency 
convertibility.  Member of the EEC. Average tar- 
iff less  than 40 percent  in 1962. Source:  Balassa 
(1965, table 1, p. 580). No  major increase  in pro- 
tection  1962-93. 
Jamaica  Open from independence  (1962) to  1973, closed 
1973-89,  open  since  1989. The  classification  as 
open in the 1960s is based on various issues of the 
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions, 
and data showing that the mean black market pre- 
mium was only 6 percent. The IMF's  1967 report 
states  that "most goods  may be imported freely 
under an open general license" (p. 348). Jamaica is 
disqualified between  the early 1970s and the mid- 
1980s, based  on a high mean black market pre- 
mium.  The  1973 and  1989 datings are based  on 
TIDE,  p.  239.  Referring  to  the  recent  reforms, 
Williamson  (1992)  states:  "Quantitative  restric- 
tions eliminated and tariffs lowered to 20 percent 
to 30 percent for most items" (p. 373). 
Japan  Open since 1964, when Japan assumed the obliga- 
tions of article VIII and established  full currency 
covertibility  (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange 
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40 percent in 1962. Source: Balassa (1965, table 1, 
p. 580). No major increase in protection  1962-93. 
Jordan  Open since  1965. Jordan appears to be a case of a 
moderately restrictive trade regime that neverthe- 
less  qualifies as open by our standards. The gov- 
ernment  has  required  import  licenses  since  at 
least 1951. In the 1950s Jordan allowed importing 
only by registered importers who were allocated 
foreign exchange  based on the government's  an- 
nual import plan. In the 1960s Jordan introduced 
a list of prohibited imports, but this included only 
afew  products. By the mid-1960s the IMF reports 
state that import licenses  were granted freely ex- 
cept  for items  on  these  lists  (see,  for example, 
IMF, Annual Report  on Exchange  Restrictions, 
1967, p. 361). The black market premium was low 
throughout the period 1960-90 (the mean is 4 per- 
cent),  indicating that import restrictions  did not 
lead  to  severe  excess  demand  for  foreign  ex- 
change.  In 1987 the average import tariff was be- 
low our 40 percent threshold,  at 33 percent (Hu- 
sain and Faruqee,  1994, p.  37), and it has fallen 
since then. 
Kenya  Open 1963-67,  followed  by closing,  and then re- 
form  in  1993.  When  it  became  independent  in 
1963, Kenya  entered  into  a customs  union  that 
had internal free trade and a common external tar- 
iff with Tanzania and Uganda. The external tariff 
was 30 percent for most goods,  but 0 percent for 
equipment,  and 75 percent  for luxuries  such  as 
cosmetics  (Barve  1984, p. 27). The black market 
premium averaged less than 20 percent during the 
1960s. Hence  Kenya qualifies as open by our cri- 
teria during this period. The liberalization ended 
with the Exchange  Control Act of  1967 and was 
followed  by  a gradual increase  in licensing  and 
tariffs in the 1970s. Since the late 1980s there has Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner  85 
been extensive  trade liberalization,  but the black 
market premium was  higher than 20 percent  in 
1989  and  1990.  Source:  Husain  and  Faruqee 
(1994) and the Economist  Intelligence  Unit, vari- 
ous reports. 
Korea  Open since  1968. The exchange  rate was unified 
by the mid-1960s. The black market premium fell 
below 20 percent in the period 1965-69. A gradual 
reduction  in  import  tariffs  started  in  the  mid- 
1960s. Source: Nam (1989, pp. 165-66). By  1968, 
the average  tariff was  below  40 percent  (Collins 
and Park, 1989, table 9.12). 
Lesotho  Not rated. Ambiguous case due to membership in 
the  Southern African  Customs  Union.  (See  dis- 
cussion  in appendix above.) 
Liberia  Not rated. Insufficient data on trade policy. 
Luxembourg  Open since  1959, when convertibility  was estab- 
lished. The average tariff in the Common Market 
was less than 40 percent in 1962. Source: Balassa 
(1965, table 1, p. 580). No  major increase in pro- 
tection  1962-93. 
Madagascar  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score  of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p. 238). The ex- 
port marketing board was still rated as a 4 in 1990. 
There  is  no  mention  of  significant reform since 
(TIDE, p. 294). 
Malawi  Never  open. Closed since early 1970s, based on a 
high black market premium as well as a rating of 4 
on its export  marketing board (Husain and Far- 
uqee,  1994,  p.  238).  Not  rated  as  a  recent  re- 
former, based on discussion  in TIDE, p. 299. 
Malaysia  Open since independence  (1963). The black mar- 
ket  premium has  never  exceeded  2 percent.  In 
1965 the IMF states  that "most imports are per- 86  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
mitted freely under open general licenses"  (IMF, 
Annual Report  on Exchange  Restrictions,  1965, 
p. 347). Malaysia qualifies on all of our trade indi- 
cators and there is no evidence  of any major pol- 
icy changes in the 1970s (TIDE, p. 304). 
Mali  Open since  1988. Pursued state-led development 
between  independence  in  1960, and  1988. State 
monopolization  of exports  (Husain and Faruqee, 
1994, p. 238) and extensive  import licensing (IMF, 
Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions,  1965, 
p. 353). Scores a 3 on the export marketing index 
in 1990; TIDE, p. 314, dates the reforms as start- 
ing in 1988. 
Malta  Not  rated, due to insufficient data on trade poli- 
cies. 
Mauritania  Open since 1992. Rated closed during 1970-90 be- 
cause of a high black market premium, and a 4 on 
the export monopoly  index.  TIDE, p. 320, states 
that 1992 marks the decisive  intensification of re- 
forms. 
Mauritius  Open since independence  in 1968. Source: TIDE, 
p. 324. 
Mexico  Open since  1986. A combination of moderate tar- 
iffs and extensive  import licensing since the early 
1950s. In the 1960s, 80 percent of tariff lines were 
covered by licensing (Bueno,  1971, p. 181). A high 
black market premium also disqualifies Mexico in 
the early 1980s. The 1986 dating for the reform is 
based on TIDE, p. 328. 
Morocco  Open from independence  in 1956, to 1964, closed 
1964-84, open since  1984. Imports could be made 
freely from French franc area countries up to 1964 
(IMF, Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions, 
various issues).  Introduction of a list of permitted 
imports,  and  prohibition  of  everything  else,  in 
1964 (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange  Restric- Jeffrey  D. Sachs and  Andrew  Warner  87 
tions,  1965). In 1980 the mean unweighted  tariff 
was  47  percent  (IMF,  Annual  Report  on  Ex- 
change  Restrictions,  1995, p.  33). The dating of 
the 1984 liberalization is based on Nsouli and oth- 
ers (1995, pp. 32-33).  By the mid-1980s the quota 
coverage,  mean tariff, and black  market premi- 
ums were all below our thresholds for openness. 
Mozambique  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). TIDE, 
p. 351, does  not present any evidence  of a major 
recent reform effort. 
Myanmar  Never open. 
Nepal  Open  since  1991. Not  rated open  between  1960 
and 1990 because of a high black market exchange 
rate premium. Not rated open in the 1950s, based 
on evidence  in Shreshtha (1981). The dating of the 
reform in 1991 is based on the discussion  in TIDE, 
p. 356. 
Netherlands  Open since  1959, based  on date of full currency 
convertibility.  Member of the EEC.  The average 
tariff in the Common Market was less than 40 per- 
cent  in  1962.  Source:  Balassa  (1965,  table  1, 
p. 580). No major increase in protection  1962-93. 
New Zealand  Open since  1986. Quantitative  trade restrictions 
covered  more than 40 percent of imports in 1981 
and 1983, and had fallen below 40 percent by 1986 
(Laird and Yeats,  1990, table 4.2). 
Nicaragua  Open 1950-60,  closed  1961-90,  open since  1991. 
In the  1950s Nicaragua had import licensing  and 
surcharges for acquiring foreign exchange for im- 
porting, but the licenses  were freely granted and 
the average  surcharge did not exceed  40 percent 
(IMF, Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions, 
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since  the mean black market exchange  rate pre- 
mium exceeds  20 percent. In addition, Nicaragua 
adopted  the  high external  tariffs of  the  Central 
American Common Market in the period 1966-86. 
The 1991 dating for the reform is based on TIDE, 
p. 361. 
Niger  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score  of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). TIDE, 
p.  365, does  not present  any evidence  of a sus- 
tained recent reform effort. 
Nigeria  Never open. The black market premium averaged 
68 percent for the period 1965-90.  We lack good 
evidence  from the early 1960s. The period  1986- 
92  may  qualify  as  a  liberalization  (see  TIDE, 
p. 365, for example), but the average black market 
premium was 135 percent in 1985-89, so we do not 
rate this as a liberalization. 
Norway  Always open. Full currency convertibility in 1960 
following  membership  in  the  European  Free 
Trade Association.  The IMF's Annual  Report  on 
Exchange  Restrictions  provides  evidence  of the 
liberal trading environment since  1960. 
Pakistan  Never open. Insufficient data on the period 1947- 
55. In 1955 the average import tariff exceeded  40 
percent (Islam,  1981, table 5.2, p. 60). Extensive 
import licensing  through  1983. Pakistan's  rating 
on Guisinger and Scully's  (1991, p. 232) index of 
import liberalization would have to exceed  16, in- 
dicating tariffs less  than 50 percent,  to qualify as 
open, and it never does during the 1960-83 period. 
The judgment that recent trade reforms have not 
gone far enough is based on TIDE, p. 391. 
Panama  Not rated, due to insufficient data on trade policy. 
Papua New Guinea  Never  open.  The average black market premium 
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policy to rate either the period between  indepen- 
dence (1975) and 1980, or the late 1980s. 
Paraguay  Open since  1989. The black market premium av- 
eraged 68 percent and 38 percent in the first and 
second  halves  of  the  1980s,  respectively.  The 
black market premium was  eliminated when the 
exchange  rate was unified in 1989. Trade liberal- 
ization also was implemented in 1989. By Decem- 
ber 1989 the simple average tariff was 16.2 percent 
(World Bank, 1992b, p. 54). 
Peru  Open 1948-67, followed by closing, and then open 
since  1991.  Thorp  and  Bertram  (1978)  is  the 
source for the dating of the temporary liberaliza- 
tion episode.  It is supported by a low black market 
premium,  which  was  2 percent  during  1960-64 
and 8 percent  during  1965-69.  Peru is  rated as 
closed  during  1970-90  because  of  a high black 
market premium. The 1991 date for the recent re- 
form is based on TIDE, p. 410. 
Philippines  Open since  1988. The assessment  that the Philip- 
pines  was  not  sufficiently  open  in the  1950s is 
based on data in Intal and Power (1990, table 2.4) 
that the average  rate of protection  exceeded  40 
percent  in the  1960s, and also  on Papageorgiou, 
Michaely,  and Choksi  (1991, vol.  2, figure 2.12, 
p.  24) who  rate the  1950s as less  open  than the 
1960s. For later periods,  we  rely on our indica- 
tors,  and  on  Shepherd  and  Alburo  (1991)  and 
TIDE, p. 414. 
Poland  Open since  1990. Source: European Reconstruc- 
tion and Development  Bank (1994). 
Portugal  Always  open. The dictatorship in power  1928-74 
did  not  introduce  extremely  restrictive  tariffs 
(Avillez,  Finan, and Josling,  1988, p. 19). Charter 
member of the European Free Trade Association 
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timetable for removing tariffs, but average tariff 
levels were low and applied mainly to agricultural 
products. The postrevolution  government in 1974 
sought a delay on the tariff reductions but under- 
took no increase  in protection  rates (Avillez,  Fi- 
nan, and Josling,  1988). We have found no source 
that reports average tariff rates for Portugal, but 
based  on our reading of Avillez,  Finan,  and Jo- 
sling (1988) and our knowledge  of the tariff rates 
of other EFTA countries,  it is very unlikely that 
Portugal's  average  tariff  exceeded  40  percent. 
Trade liberalization resumed in 1980. 
Rwanda  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score  of 4 on its export  marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). 
Senegal  Never  open.  Not  rated as open before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score  of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). TIDE, 
p. 437, does  not present any evidence  of a major 
recent reform effort. 
Sierra Leone  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain  and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  The 
state-controlled export monopsony is still in oper- 
ation. The average black market premium was 408 
percent in 1985-90. There is no evidence  in TIDE 
of a major recent reform effort. 
Singapore  Open since independence  in 1965. 
Somalia  Never  open.  Average  black market premium ex- 
ceeded  20 percent in the  1970s and 1980s. Rated 
as socialist  by Kornai (1992). In 1992 the United 
Nations  declared  Somalia  a  country  without  a 
government (Famighetti,  1993, p. 808). 
South Africa  Open since 1991. Source: Lachman and Bercuson 
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followed  an import-substitution and inward-look- 
ing development  strategy. This was reinforced by 
externally  imposed  trade and financial sanctions 
in  1985.  The  United  States  and  several  other 
countries began lifting trade sanctions in the sum- 
mer of 1991. Thus although it is hard to put a pre- 
cise  date on qualification as open,  1991 seems  a 
reasonable assumption. 
Spain  Open since 1959. In July 1959 Spain unified its ex- 
change rate, liberalized imports, and made its cur- 
rency convertible with the currencies of other Or- 
ganization  for  European  Economic  Community 
(OEEC)  countries  (IMF,  Annual Report  on Ex- 
change  Restrictions,  1960, p.  284).  The  sum of 
tariffs and indirect taxes on imports averaged 18.1 
percent in 1961, and fell gradually for the next 27 
years (Gamir, 1990). 
Sri Lanka  Open  1950-56,  closed  1956-77,  open  1977-83, 
closed  1983-91,  open  since  1991. The  dating is 
based on Cuthbertson and Athokorala (1991). The 
dating for 1983 is based on the annual black mar- 
ket premium data in Cowitt (1986). 
Swaziland  Not  rated.  Inherently  ambiguous  case  due  to 
membership  in  the  Southern  African  Customs 
Union.  (See discussion  in appendix above.) 
Sweden  Open since  1960, based  on the date of full cur- 
rency convertibility  following  membership in the 
European Free Trade Association.  No black mar- 
ket  exchange  rate  premium;  average  tariff less 
than 40 percent in 1962. Source: Balassa (1965, ta- 
ble  1, p.  580).  No  major increase  in protection 
1962-93  (IMF, Annual Report  on Exchange  Re- 
strictions,  various issues). 
Switzerland  Always open. Full currency convertibility.  Mem- 
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since  1960. No  black market exchange  rate pre- 
mium, and low tariffs since at least 1950. 
Syrian Arab  Open  1950-65,  closed  since  1965. The dating of 
Republic  the initial phase  of liberalization  is based on the 
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 
1950-66, which does not report any significant im- 
port barriers. This open era ended in 1965, when 
a state trading company,  SIMEX,  was granted a 
monopoly  on  the  purchase  of  imports.  In  1965 
SIMEX  purchases  represented  55 percent  of all 
imports (IMF, Annual Report  on Exchange  Re- 
strictions,  1966, p. 521). Classified as closed  dur- 
ing the  1980s due to a high quota coverage  and a 
high  black  market  premium.  The  country  had 
multiple exchange  rates for  everything  in  1993, 
and current account restrictions,  according to the 
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange  Restrictions, 
1993. The average  effective  import tariff was  27 
percent in the mid-1980s. In 1980s the quota cov- 
erage was above 40 percent and the black market 
premium was well above  20 percent.  There is no 
evidence  of recent reform. 
Taiwan  Open since  1963, based on Lin (1993). 
Tanzania  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). Tanza- 
nia is not rated as a reformer since 1990, due to the 
discussion  in TIDE, p. 475. 
Thailand  Always open. Source: Phongpaichit (1992). 
Togo  Never  open.  Not  rated as open  before  1990 be- 
cause  it has a score  of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain and Faruqee,  1994, p. 238). Togo is 
not rated as a reformer since  1990 due to the dis- 
cussion in TIDE, p. 486. 
Trinidad and  Never  open. Based on our indicators and the dis- 
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Tunisia  Open since  1989. Rated not open in the 1960s be- 
cause the black market premium exceeded  20 per- 
cent. The dating of reform is based on Nsouli and 
others (1993, pp. 26-29).  Extensive  import licens- 
ing was in place in 1985, covering 82 percent of im- 
ports. A five-year trade reform program started in 
1986, precipitated  by the decline  in oil prices  in 
January 1986. The first stage (1986-88)  saw liber- 
alization of intermediates  and capital goods;  the 
second  stage (1988-91)  saw further liberalization 
of consumer goods.  By 1989 the coverage of non- 
tariff barriers had fallen below 40 percent for the 
first time. The black market premium data show a 
small  premium  (7  percent)  starting as  early  as 
1975. The IMF's  Annual Report on Exchange Re- 
strictions  records no current account restrictions 
in 1989. 
Turkey  Open 1950-53,  closed  1954-88,  open since  1989. 
The  dating  of  the  first liberalization  episode  is 
based on Togan (1994, p. 20) and Krueger (1978). 
The economy was closed after a massive crop fail- 
ure in 1954 (Togan,  1994). The black market pre- 
mium exceeded  20 percent throughout the 1960s. 
Trade liberalization was started in the 1980s, but 
not until 1989 did average nominal tariff rates fall 
below  40 percent  (Togan,  1994, tables  2.11  and 
2.12, pp. 52-53). 
Uganda  Open since  1988. Not  rated as open before  1988 
because it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain  and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  The 
1988 dating is based on TIDE, p. 538. 
United Kingdom  Always open. No black market exchange rate pre- 
mium, and average tariff was less than 40 percent 
in  1962. Source:  Balassa  (1965, table  1, p.  580). 
No  major increase  in protection  1962-93.  Con- 
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United States  Always open. No black market exchange rate pre- 
mium, and average tariff was less than 40 percent 
in 1962. Source:  Balassa  (1965, table  1, p.  580). 
No major change in protection  1950-93. 
Uruguay  Open since 1990. Uruguay is rated as closed in the 
1950s, based on various issues  of the IMF's An- 
nual  Report  on  Exchange  Restrictions  and  the 
discussion  in Favaro and Spiller (1991). High av- 
erage  tariff  rates,  given  in  Favaro  and  Spiller 
(1991, table 2.10),  mean that Uruguay  was  also 
closed from 1961 through 1982. The 1990 dating is 
based on TIDE, p. 521. 
Venezuela  Open  1950-59,  closed  1960-89,  open  1989-93, 
closed  since  1993. In the  1950s Venezuela  was 
bound  by  a  trade  agreement  with  the  United 
States  that  kept  protection  low  (Allen,  1977, 
p.  92). The lack of exchange  restrictions  during 
this period is confirmed by the IMF's Annual Re- 
port on Exchange Restrictions.  In 1959 a new gov- 
ernment  used  the  treaty's  escape  clause  and 
sharply increased protection (Allen,  1977, p. 92). 
The dates for the second temporary liberalization 
are based on TIDE, p. 530. 
Yemen Arab  Always  open.  North Yemen,  which has been in- 
Republic  dependent since  1918 as the Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic,  is rated as open due to its low  black market 
premium, low quota coverage,  and an average tar- 
iff of less than 40 percent. South Yemen (the Peo- 
ple's  Democratic  Republic  of  Yemen)  merged 
with North Yemen in 1990; we do not rate it sepa- 
rately, prior to that date. 
Yugoslavia  Never  open.  Socialist,  according  to  Kornai 
(1992). 
Zaire  Never  open.  Zaire has never pursued open eco- 
nomic policies,  and there has been no recent re- 
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Zambia  Open since  1993. Not  rated as open before  1990 
because it has a score of 4 on its export marketing 
board (Husain  and Faruqee,  1994, p.  238).  The 
1993 date is based on TIDE, p. 538. 
Zimbabwe  Never  open.  The  Federation  of Rhodesia  (Zim- 
babwe) and Nyasaland,  established  in 1953, had 
very high rates of protection.  This economic  iso- 
lation  was  intensified  with  the  imposition  of 
United  Nations  sanctions  in  1966.  Source: 
Ndlovu  (1994, pp. 10, 59). Rhodesia,  and after its 
independence  in  1980,  Zimbabwe,  had  a  black 
market premium that averaged above  90 percent 
in the  1970s and 1980s. It is also rated as closed 
because  it is  on  Kornai's  (1992) list of  socialist 
economies.  It is not rated as a recent  reformer, 
due to the discussion  in TIDE, p. 553. Comments 
and Discussion 
Anders  Aslund:  Jeffrey  Sachs  and  Andrew  Warner have  written  a 
broad and most stimulating paper. They have included a large number 
of countries and formulated a clear hypothesis  which can be statistically 
tested,  thanks to a strict categorization. 
Their main conclusion  is that reform works and that there is no invin- 
cible poverty trap, which is easy to agree with. Even if countries experi- 
ence falling GDP for years, they can catch up by adopting the right eco- 
nomic  policies.  A  second  conclusion  is  that  openness  to  global 
integration is the crucial criterion of good  economic  policies,  and the 
rest follows.  That is less obvious.  A third, less elaborated, theme is why 
some countries  adopt the right policies  at certain times,  and others do 
not. Here the reasoning is neither complete nor stringent. 
While  the  denial  of  an invincible  poverty  trap seems  convincing, 
there are several factors to consider. The authors bring up a great many, 
but there are others; for instance,  migration and various forms of inter- 
national intervention.  If we ignore racism and look upon all factors  of 
production as transferable, it is indeed difficult to accept that a poverty 
trap is given once and for all. 
However  I feel  uneasy  with the word convergence,  because  it sug- 
gests that there is one ideal that everyone  can learn; that the leaders can 
do no wrong or unlearn this ideal, and that their challengers can do no 
better. Coming from Sweden,  I am firmly convinced that good economic 
policies  and institutions can be unlearned and abolished.  Argentina is a 
country with a longer record of economic  unlearning. We are consider- 
ing very long periods and this convergence  may be temporary, lasting 
only a few decades. 
Sachs and Warner have simply defined their criteria for an open econ- 
omy,  found  the  statistics  for  their  categorization,  and  tested  their 
hypotheses.  In this fashion,  they  have  largely  avoided  the  question: 
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Which are the necessary  prerequisites for successful  reform? They ar- 
gue that relatively free foreign trade and a reasonably convertible  cur- 
rency are sufficient conditions for the success  of economic  reform; they 
assume, for instance,  that macroeconomic  stabilization follows. 
The correlation between  openness  to foreign trade and the ability of 
poorer countries to catch up is convincing,  but the causality needs to be 
proven further. What roles do other factors play? Usually, a government 
adopts a sensible policy covering many fields, and trade liberalization is 
only one aspect. For instance, liberalization and macroeconomic  stabili- 
zation are usually introduced in parallel, in one package. 
In recent years Sachs has presented  a number of alternative lists of 
the four to six factors essential  to the success  of economic  reform. ' All 
of them seem quite sensible. It would be useful to test these factors as far 
as possible  to find the truly crucial preconditions  of success.  Common 
suggestions  have been: openness  to foreign trade, domestic  liberaliza- 
tion,  convertibility,  macroeconomic  stabilization,  international finan- 
cing, a pegged exchange rate, mass privatization, a social safety net, and 
certain political criteria (strong leader, insightful political elite, civil so- 
ciety,  manageable  interest  groups,  political  pluralism,  public  educa- 
tion). Apart from international financing, all of these criteria are institu- 
tional, which makes testing more complicated. 
The liberalization of foreign trade and the introduction of a convert- 
ible currency are hardly sufficient conditions  for economic  growth.  A 
country with a very open economy  can have bad incentives  in the form 
of excessive  taxes  and public expenditures,  and stay  at a suboptimal 
equilibrium for decades.  Sweden is an obvious example.  In a recent pa- 
per Sachs has written about the entitlement trap in eastern Europe, par- 
ticularly in Hungary.2 
Similarly, the importance of a social safety net has been exaggerated 
in the discussion of former socialist countries. I am struck by its absence 
in discussions  of East  Asia.  It is difficult to understand why  a social 
safety net is enormously  important in eastern Europe and of no conse- 
quence in East Asia.  Clearly the social safety net has a bigger place in 
political rhetoric than in sound economic  analysis.  Even Russia had so- 
cial expenditures of 21 percent of GDP in 1994.3  No country at this level 
1.  See, for example,  Sachs (1992, 1995d, 1995e). 
2.  Sachs (1995b, 1995c). 
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of economic  development  has been successful  with such large social ex- 
penditures. 
An issue  that is likely to prove  important, and that applies to third 
world countries as well, is privatization. The degree of privatization will 
contribute to our understanding of the transition of the former commu- 
nist countries in the longer run. Therefore we should include the relative 
size of the private sector as a plausible precondition for success. 
Previously,  Sachs made a strong case for international financing, but 
that is missing from this paper.4 It would have been interesting to have 
seen a discussion  of the role of international financing in successful  eco- 
nomic reform here.  However,  the case  may be hard to prove because 
international financing has been connected  with very different kinds of 
conditionality. 
The, Soviet  Union gave a lot of foreign aid, but it was conditional on 
devastating  economic  policies.  The Nordic  countries  have given huge 
amounts of aid to socialist countries in Africa, particularly to Tanzania, 
on the understanding that they build African socialism.  The West gave 
export  credits  to benign communist  states  such  as Yugoslavia  under 
Josip  Broz  Tito,  Poland  under  Edward  Gierek,  and  Hungary  under 
Janos Kadar,  so that they  could  maintain liberal communist  policies. 
None of this aid did much good. 
Clearly, international financing is beneficial only if it is accompanied 
by the right conditionality,  but views of what is right have changed very 
fast. As a result there is great skepticism of the benefits of foreign finan- 
cing. A key question is: Under what conditions is international financing 
objectively  beneficial?  Which  conditions  are  really  necessary,  and 
which are superfluous or even harmful? Until we can provide clear an- 
swers  to these  questions,  it will be difficult to convince  people  of the 
need to provide international financing to developing countries. 
Probably the most fun part of the paper is the discussion  of why re- 
forms happen, but it is not fully elaborated. It contains very interesting 
points, for example, that ideology and elites are more important than in- 
terest groups in countries with poor political structures. But the number 
of possible  causes  is large and more factors  should be brought into the 
discussion.  For instance,  the paper discusses  the significance  of land, 
although natural resource endowment in general appears more relevant. 
I know that Sachs and Warner are writing another paper on the theme 
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that natural resources imply rents, and that if there are a lot of rents in a 
society,  rent-seeking  develops,  which is the opposite  of profit-seeking 
and the sound economic  policies  that lead to growth. This kind of rea- 
soning should be included in the first part of this paper. 
It is surprising that the authors do not find statistical  evidence  that 
small countries can liberalize their foreign trade regime more easily than 
large ones.  There are strong reasons why small countries should tend to 
liberalize earlier than large ones. The politics of reform is much easier in 
a country with less political complexity,  and the costs  of the economic 
distortions  caused by protectionism  are much more forceful in a small 
economy  than in a large economy,  such as China. I wonder if this lack 
of evidence  may reflect some flaw in methodology.  If you distinguish be- 
tween regions, it might turn out that the smallest countries in each region 
tend to liberalize most.  Notably  there are many small countries  in Af- 
rica, which  has not been very liberal overall,  but few  in the generally 
more liberal Asia. 
A minor point concerns  the comment that the Meiji restoration was 
the first shock therapy in history. While it certainly can qualify as shock 
therapy, it was not the first. The big liberalizations in Europe in the mid- 
dle of the nineteenth century were outstanding examples,  especially  the 
massive  deregulation in Britain in 1846. It is noteworthy  that this was 
followed  by three decades  of laissez faire because  the legal system and 
the public administration were too weak to be effective,  and excessive 
reliance on them would have exacerbated corruption. 
Finally,  on the outlook  for the future the paper compares  our time 
with the end of the nineteenth  century to argue that a global capitalist 
system is taking shape. Yet this builds upon two assumptions: first, that 
trade policy  is the driving force,  and second,  that trade policy  is  set 
firmly on a liberal track. Considering how difficult it was to conclude the 
Uruguay Round and to convince  the U.S.  Congress to vote for the rati- 
fication of the GATT and the NAFTA,  the commitment to trade liberal- 
ization does not appear all that strong. 
If we focus on something other than trade liberalization, the parallel 
with the end of the nineteenth century does not hold. Another key fea- 
ture of the period before 1914 was financial stability and currency stabil- 
ity, whereas our time is characterized  by extreme financial instability. 
Failure to deal with currency instability typically leads to protectionism. 
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that our understanding of the causality between these two factors is too 
limited to warrant the degree of optimism  that Sachs  and Warner ex- 
press. 
This worry is further aggravated by the state of international politics. 
As the authors rightly point out, the period before  1914 was character- 
ized by British world dominance.  The end of the cold war appears to 
have brought an end to U.S.  world dominance. Today the United States 
neither perceives  sufficient international threats nor has sufficient inter- 
est to spend the resources  on foreign policy  necessary  to stay a world 
leader. Nobody  else is prepared to take up world leadership. Therefore 
the current political situation is reminiscent of the situation immediately 
after World War I, at the time of the Versailles peace treaty. 
So what are we to expect in this situation? We are likely to see inter- 
national crises developing,  perhaps in the currency sphere, and no one 
will be, strong enough to deal with them. For global economic  success, 
we  need  international institutions  that can handle major international 
economic  problems.  However  the  institutional  innovations  since  the 
end of the cold war have been miserable: the European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development,  the Maastricht treaty,  and the Common- 
wealth of Independent States.  The League of Nations  and the Interna- 
tional Labor Organization, which emanated from the Versailles  peace 
process,  appear masterpieces  in comparison. 
Stanley Fischer:  Sachs and Warner have given us an interesting,  chal- 
lenging, and in places  splendidly written, tripartite paper, ranging over 
the last two centuries and the entire globe, with views that run the gamut 
from Marx and Engels to Pollyanna, and ending with a degree of caution 
that, while appropriate, is not consistent  with the rest of the paper. 
I will discuss  the paper in the order in which it is presented,  starting 
with the global economy  of a century ago, then turning to the reasons 
that the liberal-market-capitalist model lost favor in the 1930s and 1940s, 
then to the empirical results,  and finally, to what we should make of it 
all. 
The Global Economy 
Many aspects  of the global economy  are indeed closer  now to what 
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close  of the nineteenth century countries were linked through trade, as 
well as through massive  capital flows corresponding to current account 
deficits and surpluses on a scale,  relative to GDP, that would hardly be 
acceptable  today.  The international capital markets were  highly inte- 
grated in at least two senses:  first, that rates of return in the major mar- 
kets of London, New York, and Paris moved together and, as a result of 
the invention  of the  telegraph,  very  rapidly so;  and second,  that,  as 
Sachs and Warner tell us, the British colonies  and dominions,  much of 
Latin America, and Russia borrowed in those markets to finance devel- 
opment. Then, as now, there were occasional  financial panics and debt 
difficulties  in the developing  countries,  the Argentina-related  Barings 
crisis of 1890 among them. I will come  back to the question of the role 
played by the gold standard in promoting these capital flows. 
Sachs and Warner point to the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the 
International Telegraph Union as early exemplars of international insti- 
tutions,  but those  are technical  institutions,  the running of which  in- 
volves  very little that is genuinely  political.'  Rather, the international 
system  was run mainly by Britain, in the framework of the gold stan- 
dard, with the Bank of England acting as lender of last resort-albeit  not 
systematically  or with much thought to its international obligations. 
We need to take a moment to reflect on the picture of the success  of 
the international system painted in the famous quote from Keynes.  His 
description  of  the  London  gentleman,  probably  yet  abed,  who  com- 
mands the world's resources  through his telephone,  applied directly to 
very few  people.  The benefits  of globalization  in the British colonies 
probably accrued largely to the European settlers, not to the natives. No 
doubt there was a trickle down from the growing prosperity of the set- 
tlers to the natives  who worked for them, but that was-except  in the 
case of a few missionaries-largely  the work of the invisible hand. The 
general lack of explicit concern for the colonized  must have contributed 
to the economic  philosophy  of the early-postcolonial  leaders,  to which 
Sachs and Warner refer. 
It is hard to judge from this distance to what extent global living stan- 
dards were converging at the end of the nineteenth century.  Labor mi- 
gration to  new  countries  must  have  helped  bring about convergence 
1.  My LSE tutor, the late Leonard Schapiro, once asked me why no one studies the 
successful international organizations, like the UPU,  rather than those that do not work. I 
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among people of European origin, but we do not have evidence  of con- 
vergence  among  non-European  countries  or  among  people  of  non- 
European origin. The evidence  by Williamson quoted in the paper re- 
lates  largely to European  countries.  Almost  certainly,  labor mobility 
played an important role in bringing about whatever  degree of conver- 
gence was attained in that era. 
Policy  and Ideological  Changes 
Sachs and Warner are right to characterize Keynes's  1933 comments 
on the benefits of autarky as muddleheaded.  But they very much under- 
estimate the role of the Great Depression  and of the apparent success  of 
the Soviet  model in the  1930s in bringing about the change in thinking 
that they deplore. Indeed, Keynes  was speaking at a time when Britain 
was doing better than the United States,  after it had moved away from 
its more liberal trade policies  of the period up to 1930. 
In the  1930s the United  States  economy  went into deep depression 
from which it emerged very slowly; full employment returned only with 
a war-driven increase in aggregate demand. In the words of Don Patin- 
kin,  "the period was  one  of fear and darkness  as the Western  world 
struggled with the greatest depression that it had known."2 By contrast, 
the Soviet  economy,  according  to the data and eyewitness  accounts, 
was bounding ahead under the Stalinist planning regime that began in 
1928. Further, wartime planning in the victorious  countries  succeeded 
not only in mobilizing resources for the war, but also in maintaining full 
employment-and  in the United States and the United Kingdom, as well 
as in many other countries,  increasing prosperity. 
It is not hard to see why views  on the role of the state changed be- 
tween  1914 and 1945. It is more remarkable that the United States and 
Britain, in 1944 and 1945, managed to impose  their vision  of a liberal 
trading  system  on  the  architecture  of  the  international  system  that 
emerged at Bretton Woods.  A clear-headed look at the evidence  of the 
last few decades  at that point should have led most people  to view the 
market model with suspicion,  and a large role for the state with approba- 
tion-and  it did. 
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The Evidence 
After providing us with their Olympian view of world economic  his- 
tory over the last century, Sachs and Warner turn to the evidence  of the 
last quarter century.  One of their main conclusions  is quite extraordi- 
nary: that countries with open economies  will converge to the same level 
of income,  although admittedly it will take a long time.3 This result pro- 
vides  so much comfort to the international agencies  that in my official 
role, I should accept the conclusion  and move on. But it is nonetheless 
necessary  to check the details of the argument. 
First,  while  it is  impossible  to  categorize  countries  perfectly,  the 
groupings used in this paper do raise difficulties. I feel about them much 
as I do about most newspapers,  that they are very accurate on matters 
about which I know little. I know for sure that Zimbabwe was not a so- 
cialist country in 1970; I do not believe that Jordan has been consistently 
open  since  1970; Israel's  trade reforms began in 1963, certainly not in 
1985, and it did suffer from macroeconomic  crises after opening; it is odd 
to have both India and Hong Kong classified as open in 1995, when their 
degrees of openness  are so different; it is unclear why Lesotho and Swa- 
ziland are categorized as open and South Africa as closed,  when all three 
belong  to a customs  union.  Of course,  any  such  summary scheme  is 
bound to have difficulties. 
Second,  by starting in 1970, the authors stack the deck against the 
import-substituting strategy. Whatever happened later, Latin American 
and African countries did quite well in the 1950s and 1960s, despite their 
perverse  regimes.  We should not be surprised that it took  so long for 
them to open up. 
The strength of the Sachs-Warner results is surprising, given that the 
question  that is being looked  at, that of the influence of openness  on 
growth, has been extensively  studied before. While the early result that 
openness  contributes  to  growth  finds increasing  support from recent 
work,  no one  has found  such extraordinarily categorical  results.  Per- 
haps they  have to do with the noncontinuous  nature of the openness 
variable here, whereas  it is generally continuous  in other papers.  It is 
3.  Ben-David (1994) shows greater convergence  among countries that trade more with 
each other, a result that points in the same direction as Sachs  and Warner, but is more 
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particularly surprising that this paper reaches stronger conclusions  than 
the World Bank's famous  1987 World Development  Report, which was 
so roundly criticized for overreaching. 
One key question  is whether to believe  the argument that openness 
will lead to absolute  rather than conditional convergence.  I cannot see 
any basis for that conclusion.  There are reasons  to think that steady- 
state per capita income levels  in different countries are bound to differ, 
as a result of differences in saving rates, different rates of investment in 
human capital, and so forth. After all, income levels differ among states 
in the United States, they will always differ among individuals, and they 
will likely always differ among countries. Perhaps we can define conver- 
gence differently, to say that countries have converged if all individuals 
with the same amount of human potential  have the same earnings (or 
utility) in whatever  country  they  live-and  perhaps by the time  such 
convergence  becomes  relevant we will be able to measure human poten- 
tial.  In the  meantime,  the  claim  of  absolute  convergence  is  hard to 
accept. 
The result that the labor-to-land ratio is the variable that determines 
the timing of liberalization is surprising. The argument seems to assume 
that the country is a democracy.  Possibly the labor-to-land ratio is serv- 
ing as a proxy for the country's  size. 
Sachs and Warner make two other claims that need further examina- 
tion. The first is that no country that liberalized trade failed to grow. It 
is not clear how to define the trade regime of the zone franc  in Africa, 
but trade with France,  at least,  was open.  Yet these countries failed to 
grow during much of the 1980s. The second claim is that no country that 
liberalized subsequently  suffered from a macroeconomic  crisis. The ob- 
vious counterexample  here is Mexico; as noted above, Israel is another. 
Conclusions 
This paper does not address the implications of the major change in 
the international system since Bretton Woods-the  opening of the capi- 
tal account.  Sachs and Warner's results  show that countries that open 
to trade tend to converge.  What about countries  that open  to capital 
movements?  Logically,  opening  to  capital  movements  should  speed 
convergence.  But, of course,  globalization of capital flows also tends to 
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monetary instability likely to impede capital flows, the need for a credi- 
ble monetary policy  becomes  greater: that may help explain  why  the 
gold standard was part of the institutional structure within which capital 
flowed internationally a century ago. 
Appropriately,  Sachs and Warner conclude  on a sober note.  Open- 
ness is not enough to produce growth; stable macroeconomic  policies, 
structural policies,  and institutions are needed too. There are huge prob- 
lems of development  in Africa, and also in some other countries.  There 
is no assurance that this moment of ideological  convergence  will last in 
economics.  The sobriety is justified, but so is much of their optimism. 
General  Discussion 
Whether the correlation between openness  and growth can be largely 
attributed to  the beneficial  effects  of  trade received  a range of  com- 
ments. T. N. Srinivasan noted that trade policy and growth are both en- 
dogenous  variables,  making it hard to establish causality.  He criticized 
growth regressions in general because of such endogeneity  and because 
of measurement errors. He referred to some unpublished papers of Mar- 
cel Dagenais,  at the University  of Montreal, which show serious biases 
in such regressions due to measurement errors. Andrew Warner replied 
that the timing of events  supported the causal interpretation in the pa- 
per. Policy choices on openness after World War II were generally made 
early in the postwar period or at the start of independence,  before the 
1970-89 period used in calculating the growth rates. The discussion  of 
the postwar period in the paper indicates that policy choices  at this time 
were based largely on intellectual and political considerations.  In addi- 
tion, the evidence  in the paper on openness  and macroeconomic  crises 
measures openness  in the 1970s and crises in the 1980s. 
Srinivasan also pointed out that the simplest version of neoclassical 
trade theory suggests that openness  should have only a level effect,  not 
a long-run growth effect.  Making trade into an engine for growth re- 
quired a resort to vague externalities.  Greg Mankiw interjected that the 
level effect predicted by the neoclassical  model still takes time to fully 
work itself out,  and so appears to cause  growth in time series.  James 
Duesenberry  suggested  another  scenario  linking  trade  and  growth. 
Combining restrictive trade practices with overvaluation leads to an ex- 
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substituting industries, bottlenecking expansion in other industries. The 
macroeconomic  crisis comes  when the country attempts further expan- 
sion  anyway.  Rudiger Dornbusch  accepted  the  view  that openness, 
broadly defined, contributes  to growth through the exchange  of ideas, 
technology,  and factors of production.  But he argued that merchandise 
trade is only a marginally important part of the openness  that provides 
these benefits. 
Sachs agreed that many elements of reform packages are crucial. The 
developing countries'  choice  of a closed  trade policy was only part of a 
way of life under state-led industrialization.  Trade liberalization alone 
would not be sufficient and should be interpreted as a proxy for the more 
far-reaching programs of reform that generally come with it. However, 
he regarded trade reform as the single most powerful element of these 
programs,  both  because  of  its  direct  effects  and because  open  trade 
forces  adoption of other parts of the reform agenda. Trade exerts  this 
influence by imposing more rigorous competition,  altering the political 
economy,  constraining the government's  macroeconomic  policies  and 
manipulations in the economy,  and subjecting institutions that want ac- 
cess to international markets to the scrutiny and conditionality of the in- 
ternational environment. 
The categorization  of countries  as open or closed  drew discussion. 
James Duesenberry criticized the yes or no nature of the openness  vari- 
able.  Using  Sri Lanka's  1977 reforms as an example,  he argued that 
there is important variation in the degree of openness  among countries. 
Sri Lanka had policies for pushing exports, restricting imports, and deal- 
ing with exchange shortages. For coconuts  alone they had an export tax, 
a maximum local price,  a replanting subsidy,  and a fertilizer  subsidy. 
Sachs conceded  that the criteria used in the paper are necessarily  some- 
what arbitrary and that it is difficult to pin down just when a country be- 
comes  open.  But he argued that the errors about timing are unlikely to 
be large when working with five-year intervals. Warner mentioned that, 
in many instances,  the black market premium was the decisive  variable 
in categorizing economies  as closed  or open.  The premium is intended 
as a measure  that reflects  an array of restrictive  trade practices.  But 
Srinivasan pointed out that the premium is endogenous  and may simply 
pick up the thinness of the black market, and that it will be affected by 
interest rates and penalties for dealing in the black market. Dornbusch 
suggested that the premium is an especially dubious measure if openness 
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Discussion  turned to the political economy of trade policy and the im- 
portance  of  ideology  in the  choice  of  economic  paths  after the  war. 
Dornbusch noted that anti-fascism  was as strong a motivation for eco- 
nomic  liberalism  in postwar  Europe  as  anti-communism.  Srinivasan 
noted that Nehru was heavily influenced by the Soviet model, citing the 
1938 document of the Indian Congress Party's National Planning Com- 
mittee which envisioned  a number of state interventions including state- 
led development of heavy industry and development by import substitu- 
tion. He found this influence unsurprising, and felt that the real question 
is why  governments  did not change  their policies  when the failure of 
their initial postwar path became evident, which in India was the case by 
the mid-1960s. Why were Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore able to switch, 
while India was not? 
Duesenberry  suggested  that two kinds of selection  bias might be af- 
fecting the paper's results.  First,  since most countries  turned to open- 
ness following periods of severe crisis, the new policy was bound to look 
good.  Second,  ignoring reforms that are not maintained until the end of 
the  sample period means  that trade reforms that are not working are 
omitted from the sample.  He noted that quite a few countries have re- 
neged  on  reform.  Ghana,  the  Gambia,  and Kenya  have  all,  at  some 
point, pulled an about-face.  Warner replied that to lessen  the effect  of 
the first bias they compared growth after reform with growth in the dis- 
tant past, rather than in the immediate past. And as to the second bias, 
they failed to find hard evidence  of a country that really had liberalized 
(by their standards), and then did an about-face because of slow growth. 108  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
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